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“[W]herever we find the absence of the older kind of 
political and legal restriction of status, we find a considerable 
amount of the social restriction, the restriction of social status; 
and wherever legal and political disabilities are removed or 
changed suddenly, we find a sudden intensifying of the social 
distinctions.” 
  Alain LeRoy Locke1 
“The pure products of America go crazy—” 
 
  William Carlos Williams2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the opening pages of Albion Tourgee’s brief for the landmark case 
of Plessy v. Ferguson,3 we find a legal argument that does not seem 
immediately pertinent to the gist of a case involving separate rail car 
accommodations for whites and blacks.  Tourgee asserted that Louisiana 
had deprived Homer Plessy of the “most valuable sort of property.”4  
Indeed, he viewed the railway conductor’s efforts to place the light-
skinned Plessy in the “Jim Crow” car established for “people of color” 
as having deprived Plessy of “the reputation of being white,” a 
reputation that Tourgee equated with a property interest.5  Plessy’s 
ability to pass as white on the streets of New Orleans invested him with 
a property interest that Tourgee used to accentuate the arbitrariness of 
race classification.6  The conductor’s license to determine Plessy’s race, 
 
 1. ALAIN LEROY LOCKE, The Phenomena and Laws of Race Contacts, in RACE 
CONTACTS AND INTERRACIAL RELATIONS 41, 52 (Jeffrey C. Stewart ed., 1992). 
 2. WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, Spring and All, in COLLECTED POEMS OF WILLIAM 
CARLOS WILLIAMS, 1909–1939, at 177, 217 (A. Walton Litz & Christopher MacGowan 
eds., 1986).  
 3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 4. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9, Plessy (No. 210). 
 5. Id.; see 1890 La. Acts 111 (requiring railway companies to provide equal but 
separate accommodations for the “white and colored races,” allowing rail conductors to 
deduce racial identity in assigning each passenger to a racially specific coach or 
compartment). 
 6. Homer Plessy’s ability to pass as white on the streets and in the rail cars of 
New Orleans should not be construed to mean that he was attempting such passage.  
Historians have noted the impetus for what culminated in Plessy as a test case brought by 
black merchants in New Orleans for the purpose of challenging the segregation statutes.  
While Plessy’s light skin served to underscore the difficulty in, and capriciousness of, 
deploying racial categories, his presence in a car reserved for white passengers was 
deliberately announced prior to boarding to ensure his identification and arrest.  See 
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derived from state statute, and his consequent refusal to allow Plessy to 
enter the first-class passenger car reserved for whites denied Plessy’s 
property right in whiteness without due process of law.7  By aligning 
racial reputation with a property interest, Tourgee’s argument breached 
the formalisms of a late nineteenth-century legal discourse, which sought 
to separate the political from the social and to distinguish between 
legally recognized rights and legally created rights.8  Espousing racial 
reputation as property enabled Tourgee to bring a social or community 
standard within the ambit of a political, and therefore judicially 
cognizable, consideration of rights.  Reputation construed as property 
might then resonate with constitutional significance and receive the 
constitutional protection extended to more familiar, tangible forms of 
property.9 
 
generally CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 
(1987) (discussing Plessy as social history); OTTO H. OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER’S 
CRUSADE: THE LIFE OF ALBION WINEGAR TOURGEE (1965) (discussing the life of the 
lawyer and advocate of equal rights); OTTO H. OLSEN, THE THIN DISGUISE: TURNING 
POINT IN NEGRO HISTORY, PLESSY V. FERGUSON (1967) (discussing the context of Plessy 
and invoking Justice Harlan’s phrase in his Plessy dissent observing that the law’s 
promise of equality in segregation was but a “thin disguise” for discrimination). 
 7. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9, Plessy (No. 210). 
 8. The laissez-faire formalisms of the postbellum period sought to separate the 
design of political rights, a sphere in which the law had a “natural” role, from 
declarations regarding social relations, a domain in which the law professed no special 
competence.  See generally ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF 
LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887–1895 (1976) (discussing the emergence of 
laissez-faire constitutionalism in the 1890s as restricting the application of legal claims 
in the private arena through the elaboration and invention of substantive due process and 
the predominance of a freedom of contract ideology over the regulative exercise of the 
police power); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: 
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973) (tracing the emergence of a 
jurisprudence of social and cultural relativism as a reaction to the reigning legal 
formalisms that constrained the law’s special competence within the political sphere); 
Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American 
Enterprise, 1870–1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 
(Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) (discussing the formation, among the nineteenth-century 
legal elite, of a political realm predicated on ideologically delineated spheres of personal 
autonomy within which the law was considered competent and the challenge to that 
view’s hegemony in the recognition of broader social and cultural conditions, which 
informed rights claims); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of 
Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, in 3 RESEARCH 
IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 3, 3–24 (1980) (proposing that the pervasive rationalism of 
gilded age legal thought manifested itself as laissez-faire constitutionalism and 
langdellian legal science in the public and private realms, respectively). 
 9. With regard to the constitutional treatment of property in cultural and political 
context, see generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM  
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Tourgee’s proposition that Plessy’s “reputation [in whiteness] is 
‘property’”10 revealed the ambiguity inherent in a legal discourse that 
knit together personality and property as twin foundations of political 
virtue.11  The Lockean right of self-possession endorsed a vision of 
 
IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 23–29 (1956) (discussing property and 
economic development and tracing the divergent application of property rules between 
“passive” and “dynamic” rights holders); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS 
LEGACY 11–12, 100–06 (1990) (discussing the influence of Madisonian views of private 
property—balancing between democratic values and the privileged status of property 
owners—as foundational in shaping the structure of the American political system); 
Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 274 (1991) (proposing multiple property discourses); Thomas C. 
Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 69, 81 (J. Roland Pennock & John 
W. Chapman eds., 1980) (tracing the diffusion of property during this period); Margaret 
J. Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE: NOMOS XXXI 165, 
165, 168–75 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989) (discussing the sale of 
body parts and market alienability in relation to property law); Margaret Jane Radin, 
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958–59 (1982) (proposing a 
personality-based approach to an appreciation of property rights drawing on Hegel); 
David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions of Property in 
the American Political Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 467–80 (1993) (proposing 
a synthesis of the rhetoric and reality of property that influenced public opinion during 
the founding); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 297 
(1998) (noting the slippage between property as a concept and enforceable property 
rights in the law). 
 10. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9, Plessy (No. 210). 
 11. As a term of analysis, whiteness partakes in the notion that the meanings 
ascribed to racial identity exceed the boundaries of the biological to participate in an 
arrangement of power relations that privilege the white subject position.  The term 
whiteness draws its explanatory resonance from the complicated manner in which white 
racial markings draw power through the double gesture of an invisible presence; the 
privilege accorded white racial identity relies on the fantasy of the unprivileged 
normative position, in which only nonwhite racial identity appears as marked.  So 
understood, the deployment of “whiteness” as a category of analysis works to locate the 
meanings of racial identity in social, cultural, economic, legal, linguistic, and political 
performance and power.  Appropriately, the term “whiteness” itself participates in the 
modernist privileging of vision and appearance when it brings into focus the unmarked 
nature of white racial identity, the product of a discourse most influential when not in the 
field of vision.  For more about the hegemony of a visual discourse in modernity, see 
MARTIN JAY, DOWNCAST EYES: THE DENIGRATION OF VISION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
FRENCH THOUGHT 1–20 (1993).  For information regarding cultural, legal, social, and 
historical considerations of whiteness, see generally MIA BAY, THE WHITE IMAGE IN THE 
BLACK MIND: AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDEAS ABOUT WHITE PEOPLE, 1830–1925 (2000) 
(decentering the notion of understanding whiteness); VIRGINIA R. DOMÍNGUEZ, WHITE BY 
DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA (1986) (discussing the 
inflections of racial meaning in the specific context of Louisiana’s laws relating to blood 
percentages); GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF 
SEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH, 1890–1940 (1998) (tracing the cultural markers of 
whiteness in the nascent consumer economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995) (tracing the cultural 
and political reconstruction of Irish ethnic identity in the nineteenth-century United 
States); MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE (1998) (examining the meaning of whiteness in 
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identity as inalienable property.12  This vision, in turn, governed the 
 
the multiracial context of European immigration); SAMIRA KAWASH, DISLOCATING THE 
COLOR LINE: IDENTITY, HYBRIDITY, AND SINGULARITY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
NARRATIVE (1997) (proposing the narrativization of color as a marker of racial identity); 
LITERATURE AND THE BODY: ESSAYS ON POPULATIONS AND PERSONS (Elaine Scarry ed., 
1988); IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) 
(discussing the legal construction of race in the context of immigration law from the 
latter half of the nineteenth century to the present); ERIC LOTT, LOVE AND THEFT: 
BLACKFACE MINSTRELSY AND THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1993) (tracing the 
significant cultural and economic relationship between blackness and whiteness as 
exemplified in nineteenth-century popular performance of minstrelsy); PASSING AND THE 
FICTIONS OF IDENTITY (Elaine K. Ginsberg ed., 1996) (discussing rhetorical strategies of 
racial cross representation in nineteenth- and twentieth-century United States literature); 
DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991) (tracing race and the rhetoric of whiteness in shaping 
white working class interest in conflict with class solidarity); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, 
TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS, AND WORKING 
CLASS HISTORY (1994) (discussing whiteness as a category of analysis in studies of the 
U.S. working class); ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE REPUBLIC: 
CLASS POLITICS AND  MASS CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990) (tracing 
the practice and ideology of racial exclusion among the wage-earning working class as 
weakening working class opposition to corporate capitalism); ERIC J. SUNDQUIST, TO 
WAKE THE NATIONS: RACE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN LITERATURE (1993) (tracing 
efforts in American fiction to integrate racial differences); Wai-chee Dimock, Rightful 
Subjectivity, 4 YALE J. CRITICISM 25 (1990) (tracing the contingent quality of rights in 
Plessy); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the 
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as 
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993) (discussing the legal attributes assigned to 
white racial identity); Eric Lott, White Like Me: Racial Cross-Dressing and the 
Construction of American Whiteness, in CULTURES OF UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM 474 
(Amy Kaplan & Donald E. Pease eds., 1993); Brook Thomas, Tragedies of Race, 
Training, Birth, and Communities of Competent Pudd’nheads, 1 AM. LITERARY HIST. 
754 (1989).  On the issue of culture and racial identity, see generally JAMES CLIFFORD, 
THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND 
ART 277 (1988) (elaborating on the legal and ethnographic construction of Native 
American identity); NEIL FOLEY, THE WHITE SCOURGE: MEXICANS, BLACKS, AND POOR 
WHITES IN TEXAS COTTON CULTURE (1997) (discussing whiteness in multiracial 
context); ROBERT J.C. YOUNG, COLONIAL DESIRE: HYBRIDITY IN THEORY, CULTURE 
AND RACE 90–117, 142–58 (1995) (discussing theories of whiteness, race, and ethnography 
in the nineteenth-century colonial policies of Britain and the United States). 
 12. Locke’s philosophy of inalienable rights was premised on the notion that all 
men are in “a state of perfect freedom,” and “[a] state also of equality, wherein all the 
power and jurisdiction is reciprocal.”  Locke further emphasized “that being all equal 
and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or 
possessions.”  JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning 
the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT ¶ 4, at 116, ¶ 6, at 117 (Mark Goldie ed., 1993).  For information about the 
place of Locke at the formation of the Constitution and the new nation, see DAVID BRION 
DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 118–21 (1966); see also 
Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American 
DOUGLAS.DOC 1/9/2020  11:20 AM 
 
886 
discourse of the public realm and inherently accrued in the individual 
prior to the legal recognition of subjectivity.  In a legal regime that had 
only recently extended the rights of personality to formerly enslaved 
African-Americans, Tourgee argued that the legal recognition of identity 
preceded any property claims for the self and that such recognition 
followed racial lines.13  In short, race preceded property in the self.  For, 
 
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 860 (1978) (arguing for the centrality of 
Locke’s writing to an understanding of the rhetoric of the revolution); Stanley N. Katz, 
Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1977) (discussing the centrality of the institution of property to the 
formation). 
While the notion of the self as inalienable property mitigated against such actions as 
the physical possession of another individual’s body, it seems not to have contemplated 
the advent of the social self, where an aspect or attribute of another person could be 
assumed.  See MARSHALL J. COHEN, CHARLES HORTON COOLEY AND THE SOCIAL SELF IN 
AMERICAN THOUGHT 174–86 (1982) (discussing the advent and elaboration of theories of 
the social self into the canon of late-nineteenth-century social science in the thought of 
Cooley, William James, John Dewey, Josiah Royce, and James Mark Baldwin, each 
critiquing the dichotomy between the social and the self as foundational and proposing 
an alternative view in which the personal was an individual idea whose referent was a 
social object).  Indeed, racial identity predicated on reputation skirted alienability 
because it reconfigured notions of possession.  In this instance, no white male forfeited 
his personal property interest due to Plessy’s reputation as a white man.  However, 
Tourgee’s argument challenged the notion of the self as a coherent inalienable whole, 
separate from the social sphere, by suggesting that Plessy could assume or possess an 
attribute as property, conveyed by his standing in the larger community, without 
violating the notion of the self as inalienable property.  As such, Tourgee’s alternative 
vision rested on the notion that the law protected the viability of multiple selves, one in 
which legal value should be conferred not on the object of property that signified racial 
identity, such as blood quantum, but on property understood subjectively, as rendered by 
the community through notions such as reputation.  The law, of course, had long 
recognized reputation as worthy of protection to the degree that it reflected individual 
identity.  See MARTIN L. NEWELL, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL CASES AS ADMINISTERED IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
84 (2d ed. 1898) (discussing the historical posture of libel and slander in a defamation 
treatise). 
Tourgee, however, sought to unhinge this specific connection by suggesting that the 
property value of Plessy’s reputation lay in the community’s perception, regardless of 
the degree to which it reflected the “objectivity” of Plessy’s racial identity.  As such, 
property was the set of social relations convened around some object, in this case, 
Plessy’s phenotypically white skin color.  Tourgee sought legal protection for a 
community perception regarding Plessy’s social self, in line with William James’s 
observation in 1890 that “a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who 
recognize him.”  I WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 294 (1890) 
(suggesting a paradigm of the modern self predicated on the multiplicity of experience).  
Such protection would simultaneously validate a self for Plessy that the community 
already recognized and lend the imprimatur of the law to the notion of multiple social 
identities. 
 13. For information regarding the relationship between slavery and property, see 
DAVIS, supra note 12, at 32–39 (discussing the legal representation of the slave as a 
“thing”); see also Jarman v. Patterson, 23 Ky. (7 T.B. Mon.) 644, 644, 646 (1828) 
(finding that “a slave by our code, is not treated as a person, but . . . a thing, as he stood 
in the civil code of the Roman Empire”).  For information about the intersection of 
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as Tourgee observed, “The man who rides in a car set apart for the 
colored race, will inevitably be regarded as a colored man[,] . . . [and] to 
entail upon him such suspicion . . . is to deprive him of ‘property.’”14  
By linking Plessy’s phenotypically white appearance to reputation and 
defining reputation for whiteness as a form of property, Tourgee 
disclosed the racial and cultural dimensions of the connection between 
property and personality at the law.15 
The Plessy decision largely set the terms in which state courts in the 
American South interrogated racial identity and enforced segregation.  
This Article examines the manner in which, during the decades 
following Plessy, southern courts labored to instill the legal meaning of 
whiteness as an object of property inherent in the individual in cases 
involving racial defamation, miscegenation, and writs of mandamus to 
 
subjectivity and gender in the context of chattel slavery and the logic of property, see 
ROBYN WIEGMAN, AMERICAN ANATOMIES: THEORIZING RACE AND GENDER 62–69 (1995) 
(proposing that the cultural mechanism that eased the translation of human beings into 
the propertied abstraction attendant with chattel slavery worked by rendering impossible 
the opportunity for African American men to claim not simply gender in the abstract but 
the specificities and privileges of masculine gender that served as the framework for 
defining citizenship in the public sphere).  The de jure demise of the institution of 
slavery enabled the judiciary a cultural space within which to fashion a legal discourse 
that assigned property rights to the body of the person without compromising the 
prevailing notion of the inalienable self. 
 14. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9, Plessy (No. 210). 
 15. Id. at 23–24.  By acceding to the notion that reputation is property, the Court 
acknowledged that property value emerged from the social accommodation of some 
“thing” established in the public, rather than private, sphere. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537, 539 (1896).  Yet, for the Court, the truth of this value rested on the already 
presumed possession of whiteness as a determined racial identity; Plessy could claim a 
loss for the reputation of being white only if he was already—read innately—white.  The 
loss of reputation, a property that garnered its value through social and cultural 
circulation in the larger body politic, would only be assigned legal value if the truth of 
that reputation were possessed, as one would possess a title to land, in which the 
characteristics of the self flowed from the private self to the larger public body.  Thus, 
for the Court, racial reputation represented a property value, the truth of which issued 
from the private fact of possessing white blood untainted by racial admixture.  By 
arguing that Plessy could only claim a loss of reputation in whiteness if he was indeed 
white, the Court sought to keep questions regarding the racial nature of the self within 
the confines of the private sphere and they did so by anchoring the question of race in the 
presumed certainty of biology and blood quantum.  Driving a wedge between the social 
and the self, the public and the private, and sentiment and biology, not only enabled the 
Court to truncate the legal argument that racial identity was a social construction with 
obvious value, but also marked its effort to remove from discussion the notion that 
whiteness, like any commodity, might circulate in the market of public opinion, and 
might be claimed by anyone capable of the necessary social posture, thereby knitting 
together the social and the self through invention rather than biology. 
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white-only schools.  Deploying the seemingly objective rhetoric of 
lineage, blood purity, and appearance, these courts sought to contain the 
meaning of white selfhood. Yet, in tension with this legal rhetoric, 
whiteness garnered its legal weight through and as community opinion, 
association, and family narrative.  Further exacerbating this tension, the 
judicial discourse of whiteness relied on, for its validation and certainty, 
an object-centered notion of property, which was being reconfigured, at 
the law and in the wider culture, as an associational arrangement.  Thus, 
as courts sought to contain the property of racial identity, the discourse 
of whiteness both replicated and conditioned a profound shift in the legal 
meaning of property and personality in modernity.16 
 
 16. Conscious of the possibility of reifying the term “modernity” (as Richard 
Bernstein has cautioned against), this label is used here to specifically invoke the 
postenlightenment “turn to interiority,” in which the search for moral personality, in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, became more than an exercise in locating 
the unitary self as enunciated in the ideals of disengaged reason (positivism) or romantic 
fulfillment (romanticism), and became instead an aspiration for retrieving experience 
from the routine, the conventional, and the instrumental.  RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE 
NEW CONSTELLATION: THE ETHICAL-POLITICAL HORIZONS OF MODERNITY/POSTMODERNITY 
200 (1992). 
[I]t is becoming increasingly evident that the terms “modern” and “postmodern” 
are not only vague, ambiguous and slippery, they have been used in conflicting 
and even contradictory ways. . . .  My own conviction is that we have reached a 
stage of discussion where these labels (and their cognates) obscure more than 
they clarify—that it is better to drop these terms from our “vocabularies,” and to 
try to sort out the relevant issues without reifying these labels. 
Id.  This moment in modernity, as Charles Taylor explains, resulted in the emergence of 
a decentered subjectivity, in which the “epiphanic center of gravity [began] to be 
displaced from the self to the flow of experience, to new forms of unity, to language 
conceived in a variety of ways—eventually even as a “structure.”  CHARLES TAYLOR, 
SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 143–76, 495–512 (1989) 
(discussing modernity as marked by an enhanced extension of moral sources for identity,  
such as rational agency and expressive subjectivity, and discussing modernity not in 
terms of the loss of foundation, but in terms of the multiplicity of choices and relative 
instability accompanying the waning of theism).  Of additional interest in this modern  
period is the observation among theorists that such decentering of the self was not 
contrary to, but complementary of, the “turn to interiority,” in which the desire to grasp 
the meaning of experience resulted in a recognition of the dissonance between the 
inadequate generality of expressive concepts (such as property and personality) and the 
particularity of experience, a recognition that led to the explanatory virtue of allegory 
over symbol and a resort to the descriptive power of constellations of terms to frame the 
meaning of things.  For a discussion of modernity, see generally RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, 
BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983) 
(proposing a dialogic response to the “Cartesian anxiety” of modernism brought about by 
the absence of an Archimedean point for truth and knowledge, an anxiety that resulted 
from the difficulty of separating subject and object, thought and thing, within separate 
ontological registers); ANDREAS HUYSSEN, AFTER THE GREAT DIVIDE: MODERNISM, MASS 
CULTURE, POSTMODERNISM (1986) (discussing the dichotomies, such as between subject 
and object, thought and thing, central to the classical account of modernism and tracing 
the dissolution of these dichotomies under the press of mass culture); DAVID KOLB, THE 
CRITIQUE OF PURE MODERNITY: HEGEL, HEIDEGGER AND AFTER 60–65 (1986) (viewing 
modern culture and society as a complex interaction without any single exclusive or 
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II.  PLESSY AND PROPERTY 
Tourgee’s challenge to the accepted meaning and coherence of the 
link between property and personality suggested a mobile and social 
understanding of the two terms.17  Tourgee’s assessment served to 
undermine the presumed inalienability of self-possession by suggesting 
not only that the community, rather than the individual alone, determined 
racial identity, but also that the community’s consideration deserved 
legal protection as an informed and valuable interest of the individual.18  
The vision of the proprietary male individual of the nineteenth century, 
 
overpowering identity); JAMES LIVINGSTON, PRAGMATISM AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1850–1940, at 214–24 (1994) (discussing modern 
subjectivity as predicated on the cognitive separation between the self and a “reified 
realm of objects” and contrasting this appreciation with the promise of modern 
subjectivity proposed in early twentieth-century pragmatic thought, which resisted the 
attribution of a separate ontological register between thoughts and things); ROSS 
POSNOCK, THE TRIAL OF CURIOSITY: HENRY JAMES, WILLIAM JAMES, AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF MODERNITY (1991) (tracing the moral capacity of the modern self as 
apprehended by pragmatism); Dorothy Ross, Modernism Reconsidered, in MODERNIST 
IMPULSES IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 1870–1930, at 1 (Dorothy Ross ed., 1994). 
 17. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9–12, Plessy (No. 210).  Tourgee’s embrace of 
the social significance of personality and the social elaboration of property resonated 
with the observations, during this period, of the amalgamation of self and society.  See 
COHEN, supra note 12, at 105–24 (discussing Cooley’s contributions to a science of 
personal psychology predicated on the social); I JAMES, supra note 12, at 291 (proposing 
a confluence of self, society, and ownership in his 1890 observation that “a man’s Self is 
the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but 
his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation 
and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account”); STEPHEN KERN, THE 
CULTURE OF TIME AND SPACE, 1880–1918, at 181–210 (1983) (discussing the concurrent 
dissolution of conventions that dictated the manner in which an individual should 
experience his or her own self and the accompanying plasticity of conceptions of space, 
form, and time).  See generally H. STUART HUGHES, CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIETY: THE 
REORIENTATION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 1890–1930 (1961) (discussing the 
breakdown of the dichotomy between subject and object and the rearrangement of social 
meaning arising from that development). 
 18. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9, 23–24, Plessy (No. 210).  In his argument, 
Tourgee asserted that 
[p]robably most white persons if given a choice, would prefer death to life in 
the United States as colored persons.  Under these conditions, is it possible to 
conclude that the reputation of being white is not property?  Indeed, is it not 
the most valuable sort of property, being the master-key that unlocks the 
golden door of opportunity? 
Id. at 9; see also FRANK LENTRICCHIA, ARIEL AND THE POLICE: MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
WILLIAM JAMES, WALLACE STEVENS 103–33 (1988) (discussing the property value in the 
self as a serial attribute responsive to, and formulative of, the constellation of 
associations within which the self circulates). 
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the self-possessed master of his character,19 could not contain Tourgee’s 
idea that enunciated a slippage between the individual self and the social 
self, between the immutable object of bodily attributes and the valuation 
of those attributes within the wider community.20  Moreover, this 
slippage allowed for the possibility of appropriation and assumption 
with regard to an individual’s representation of racial identity.21  As 
 
 19. The independence of the republican individual from the vicissitudes of 
political influence and, therefore, the well-spring of moral personality in the polis, 
hinged on an object-centered conception of property prior to politics and provided the 
singular means for uncontaminated participation in the political process.  Property, 
external to the self and fixed in time and space—separated from and prior to the 
vicissitudes of the community—generated the promise of the moral personality in 
political thought and practice.  See II JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 
*318–19 (noting that the “right of property, founded on occupancy, is suggested to the 
human mind, by feeling and reason, prior to the influence of positive institutions”).  See 
generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL 
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977) (discussing the connection 
between desire and property); DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL 
ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 69–75 (1980) (discussing the influence of the 
Scottish enlightenment on Jefferson and Madison and the effort to balance political 
virtues of an agrarian society with the economic benefits of commercial manufacturing); 
J.G.A. POCOCK, Civil Humanism and Its Role in Anglo-American Thought, in POLITICS, 
LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 80, 91–96 (1971) 
(discussing the importance of the political thought of Harrington enunciating the value to 
the moral capacity of the self of the proprietary freehold as an agent for ensuring 
political and moral independence); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: 
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 412–544 
(1975) (discussing the ideology of self-determination as a regulative expression of the 
moral self that negotiated between the thought of Locke and Harrington); GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 46–90 (1969) 
(recounting intellectual events preceding the formation of the Constitution). 
 20. Tourgee’s appreciation of the shifting function and meaning of property 
presupposed an appreciation of the shifting moral capacity of the modern individual.  
Attaching the significance of identity and the self to one’s racial identity as apprehended 
by the community served to situate both personality and property within the same 
ontological register, as marked by the historical time and location of the community 
rather than as an external object standing outside of time and space.  A property form 
that marked identity through the very comportment of the self revealed the inherent 
situatedness of the moral personality.  See LIVINGSTON, supra note 16, at 214–20 
(discussing modern subjectivity under corporate capitalism); WARREN I. SUSMAN, 
CULTURE AS HISTORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 276–84 (1984) (discussing the cultural history of the distinction between 
character and personality). 
 21. See JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN 
THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION 464–75 (1984).  Williamson labels 
southerners’ fear of “hidden blackness, the blackness within seeming whiteness” as the 
“paranoid style in Southern white culture in the twentieth century.”  Id. at 465; see also 
Jones v. Gill, 66 P.2d 1033, 1033 (Kan. 1937) (reversing the damage award for the 
plaintiff and remanding for a new trial a suit involving a mother’s claim that rumors of 
the racial composition of her adopted daughter, that she “was ‘a half-breed child, having 
a white father and a negro mother,’” which forced the plaintiff to move her family to 
several different neighborhoods to escape the accusations, were started by the plaintiff’s 
stepmother-in-law); Berot v. Porte, 81 So. 323, 324 (La. 1919) (affirming a party’s 
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such, traditional notions of self-possession and inalienability were ill-
suited to Tourgee’s social understanding of selfhood.  For, in arguing that 
Plessy had a property right in passing for white, Tourgee was pointing to 
the plasticity of identity and the separate and alienable property value of 
the social self.22 
Tourgee insisted “the reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in 
this instance the white race, is property.”23  His suggestion not only 
raised the specter that racial identity was indeed alienable, but, further, 
that the property interest of identity could be located in the social 
manifestation of the self, through reputation.  To argue for a property 
value to racial subjectivity, which black claimants might appropriate, 
and for the determination of that property as external to the subject 
delineated merely through community sentiment reflected an erosion of 
a long-held vision of identity as immutable, inherent and internal, a 
touchstone that signified certainty and coherence.24  Nineteenth-century 
concerns over assuming the identity of another revolved around the 
image of confidence men and the like.25  Similarly, construing racial 
 
qualified privilege to make accusations concerning racial identity where there is a social 
or moral duty, as in this case, involving the defendant’s confidential review of the 
plaintiff’s membership application to the Order of Druids).  For contemporary accounts 
bearing witness to this “paranoid style,” see RAY STANNARD BAKER, FOLLOWING THE 
COLOR LINE: AN ACCOUNT OF NEGRO CITIZENSHIP IN THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 152–
53 (1908) (chronicling black American life and achievement in the forty years following 
emancipation by focusing on the disabling effects of segregation); J.W. GREGORY, THE 
MENACE OF COLOUR 31–104 (1925) (arguing against the amalgamation of the races as a 
form of race suicide); EDGAR GARDNER MURPHY, PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT SOUTH: A 
DISCUSSION OF CERTAIN OF THE EDUCATIONAL, INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE 
SOUTHERN STATES 151–202 (1904) (examining southern race relations); Frederick L. 
Hoffman, The Problem of Negro-White Intermixture and Intermarriage, in II SECOND 
INT’L CONGRESS OF EUGENICS, EUGENICS IN RACE AND STATE 175, 175–88 (1923) 
(discussing race amalgamation as a threat to civilization). 
 22. Tourgee also pointed to the value of the citizen self.  “The prime essential of 
all citizenship is equality of personal right and the free and secure enjoyment of all 
public privileges.  These are the very essence of citizenship in all free governments.”  
Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 14, Plessy (No. 210); see also R. JACKSON WILSON, IN 
QUEST OF COMMUNITY: SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1860–1920, at 144–
70 (1968) (discussing the relationship between equality and personality). 
 23. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 8, Plessy (No. 210). 
 24. See TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 400–65 (1989) (discussing the history of the 
conception of the self as immutable and essential). 
 25. See KAREN HALTTUNEN, CONFIDENCE MEN AND PAINTED WOMEN: A STUDY OF 
MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA, 1830–1870, at 202–03 (1982) (studying the 
appropriation of social identity in nineteenth-century middle-class culture).  Halttunen 
argues that the figure of the confidence man, rather than a source of anxiety as it had 
been with mid-century Victorian concerns over placelessness in an open, urbanizing 
DOUGLAS.DOC 1/9/2020  11:20 AM 
 
892 
identity as a property right presumed, and confirmed, the qualities of the 
self that inhered in attributes of the body—blood, hair, skin, other 
physical features—as fungible commodities whose representation might 
circulate within a cultural economy predicated on the value of whiteness. 
Courts sought to police the meaning of this cultural economy by 
insisting that claiming whiteness, like claiming any property, rested on 
both the control and ownership of title.26  In the lexicon of the law, such 
title inhered in pure white blood, without admixture.27  Yet it should 
have provided little comfort to the courts that the very standard of 
blackness in the American South—the one-drop rule—merely operated 
as an invisible mimetic backdrop against which courts and claimants 
reflected the collected evidentiary proof of racial identity.28  By focusing 
 
society, was now the ticket to success.  For instance, the Horatio Alger success formula 
represents a significant departure from the antebellum success myth that hinged on 
sincerity in form to convey sincerity of content.  The new formula for success, where the 
trickster has the necessary skills to negotiate the moral wilderness of the city, resided in 
the art of social manipulation rather than in ascetic self-discipline.  Id. at 202. 
 26. Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, 8 RARITAN 39, 40–43 (1988) 
(discussing the compatibility between blood and title in cases of miscegenation).  By 
insisting on title, the courts participated in and responded to a desire for racial purity 
incited by anxiety among whites regarding contamination and dissolution.  See SAIDIYA 
V. HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 189–206 (1997) (discussing postbellum legal strategies 
to alleviate the social uncertainty of racial categories as incited by anxieties of 
contamination of white racial purity); Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: 
White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1990) 
(discussing the role of legal rhetoric and cultural anxiety in the development of 
conceptions of “white innocence” and “black abstraction”). 
 27. See Mullins v. Belcher, 134 S.W. 1151, 1151 (Ky. 1911) (affirming the trial 
court’s determination that the plaintiff’s children had one-sixteenth “Negro blood,” 
which prevented their entrance into the white-only public school).  The court observed: 
In this connection it is insisted that appellants are as fair as members of the 
white race, and there is nothing in their personal appearance to indicate the 
presence of negro blood.  In our opinion, however, the question does not 
depend upon personal appearance.  The color of the person may be one means 
of indicating the class to which he belongs; but the question in its final analysis 
depends upon whether or not the person has, or has not, an appreciable 
admixture of negro blood. 
Id. 
 28. Variations of the one-drop rule were incorporated in state statutes in the 
American South, and even within each state variations of the rule applied depending on 
whether the activity the state sought to regulate was school attendance, marriage, 
inheritance, or paternity.  See generally MICHAEL BANTON, THE IDEA OF RACE (1977);   
F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? ONE NATION’S DEFINITION (1991) (tracing the 
development of the one-drop rule); THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 
IN AMERICA (1963) (tracing determinations of race in the United States); JOHN G. 
MENCKE, MULATTOES AND RACE MIXTURE: AMERICAN ATTITUDES AND IMAGES, 1865–
1918 (1979) (examining the social stratification developed around race mixture); Gilbert 
Thomas Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law, 43 AM. L. REV. 29, 37 (1909) 
(discussing identity and blood quantum).  Franz Fanon has noted the degree to which 
skin color served as a complicated proxy for the invisibility of blood, where together the 
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on reputation as a means of representing blood quantum, Tourgee 
located the dynamics of self-possession and racial identity in community 
opinion, impression, and sentiment.29  This position reversed the 
traditional and formal causality between property and community.30  
Plessy’s appeal relied on an understanding of property and possession as 
expressed through a set of social relations that conditioned the meaning 
of an object and presumed that, under the weight of social opinion,  
Plessy’s reputation preceded and formed the property value in his white 
skin that he then might ratify in the courts.  As such, neither property nor 
personality preceded community, but rather, issued from it.31 
Contrary to Tourgee’s argument, courts sought to draw the lines of 
identity as a surveyor might determine property lines, by invocation of 
and reference to title, anchoring their legal reasoning in the rhetoric of 
an unexamined objectivity regarding race.  In this instance, Justice 
Brown understood ownership of title as expressed by blood quantum.32  
 
“corporeal schema” of skin color and the yearning to escape into anonymity from that 
overdetermination of skin marked the “crushing objecthood,” the “fact of blackness,” in 
which black subjectivity strained to be viewed as comprised of other than the objectified, 
external manifestation of color.  FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN: WHITE MASKS 109–40 
(Charles Lam Markmann trans., Grove Press, Inc. 1967) (1952) (discussing a classic 
study of race relations and subjectivity). 
 29. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 
210); see Dimock, supra note 11, at 42 (discussing the localization of public sentiment in 
Plessy as an effort to “psychologize” the language of race). 
 30. See II KENT, supra note 19, at *319 (discussing property as prior to the 
formation of the state); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 3–24 (discussing the paradigm of 
classical legal thought as shaped by an emphasis on separate spheres of power). 
 31. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9–14, Plessy (No. 210). 
 32. Justice Brown’s embrace of the objective boundaries of racial identity 
prefigured the consonant observation by John Chipman Gray in 1909 concerning the 
parameters of the “true definition of a person”: 
Jurisprudence . . . need not vex itself about the “abysmal depths of personality.”  
It can assume that a man is a real indivisible entity with body and soul; it need 
not busy itself with asking whether a man be anything more than a 
phenomenon, or at best, merely a succession of states of consciousness.  It can 
take him as a reality and work with him, as geometry works with points, lines 
and planes. 
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 28–29 (Roland Gray ed., 
2d ed. 1921) (discussing legal categories of personality).  Yet, just as Euclid’s 
explanations of geometry could no longer contain the notion that space is a consequence 
of the act of measuring, or as Einstein observed in 1920, “[T]here is an infinite number 
of spaces, which are in motion with respect to each other,” so the conception of 
personality as an indivisible entity could not contain the multiple possibilities of property 
predicated on legal relations.  KERN, supra note 17, at 136. 
Justice Brown’s statement that Plessy had to “be a white man” to claim whiteness is 
predicated on the assumption that claimants possessed an objective racial identity in line 
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Writing for the Plessy court, Brown invoked this objectivity of racial 
identity in responding to Tourgee’s proposition that Plessy forfeited his 
property interest in whiteness when placed in a Jim Crow rail car.33  In 
agreeing, word for word, with Tourgee that the reputation of being white 
is a property interest, Brown declared the claim inapplicable, for, he 
argued, if Plessy 
be a white man and assigned to a colored coach, he may have his action for 
damages against the company for being deprived of his so called property. . . . 
[I]f he be a colored man and be so assigned, he has been deprived of no 
property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white 
man.34 
According to the Supreme Court, Plessy had to possess whiteness, to 
hold title impliedly through the object of lineage and blood, in order to 
claim damage to his reputation.  In Plessy’s legal discourse, property 
evinced by title and possession preceded personality, a claim opposite of 
Tourgee’s. 
Yet, the Plessy decision betrays the tension between the representation 
and reality of racial identity as a form and object of property.  Indeed, it 
contained the very tensions that would continue to buffet questions of 
property and personality as the law began to treat property as a set of 
jural relations and personality as an amalgam of legally recognized 
objects.35  For, after all, what did it mean to “be” a white man, to possess 
 
with the “one-drop rule.”  See FANON, supra note 28, at 109 (discussing the subjectivity 
of white racial identity and enforced objectivity of the black self); HARTMAN, supra note 
26, at 200 (discussing the effort in Plessy to regulate the social circulation of race and 
racial categories through the enforcement of objective legal markers such as blood 
quantum); Saks, supra note 26, at 43 (discussing blood quantum in the context of racial 
identity in miscegenation jurisprudence). 
 33. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9, Plessy (No. 210). 
 34. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added). 
 35. Property conceived of as a set of jural relations used the object as merely the 
starting point of analysis, while the nineteenth-century culture of the yeoman and 
proprietary freehold treated the object as the apotheosis of property.  The tensions in this 
new regime of property acceded to the subjectivity or constellation of legal concerns 
held by others.  A far-reaching debate among a group of legal writers during the first 
four decades of the twentieth century amplified the meaning and significance of jural 
relations on the practice and theory of law, as both an analytical appreciation and realist 
observation.  The proffered calculus served to further challenge, as inadequate, the 
notion of property as a cohesive legal form; property emerged from this discussion as a 
subjective psychological legal arrangement regarding some object of attention. See 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 24 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld I] (observing that 
“[m]uch of the difficulty, as regards legal terminology, arises from the fact that many of 
our words were originally applicable only to physical things; so that their use in 
connection with legal relations is, strictly speaking, figurative or fictional” in noting that 
the “true contrast” between the legal interests held by a fee simple owner of land and an 
owner of a right of way across that land rests “in the fact that the fee simple owner’s 
aggregate of legal relations is far more extensive than the aggregate of the easement 
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owner); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 746 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld II] (presenting an 
influential set of jural opposites—right or no right, privilege or duty, power or disability, 
immunity or liability—and jural correlates—right or duty, privilege or no right, power or 
liability, immunity or disability—meant to clarify the existence of legal value within a 
series of relationships); see also WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL 
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 23–114 
(Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923) [hereinafter HOHFELD, LEGAL ESSAYS]; Charles E. 
Clark, Relations, Legal and Otherwise, 5 ILL. L.Q. 26, 27 (1922) (exploring the 
significance of jural relations); Arthur L. Corbin, What Is a Legal Relation?, 5 ILL. L.Q. 
50 (1922) (urging the application of jural relations not as a means of predicting the 
certainty of the law, but as a condition for a discussion of legal value); Albert Kocourek, 
Plurality of Advantage and Disadvantage in Jural Relations, 19 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 
(1920) (discussing the application and juristic significance of Hohfeld’s conception of 
jural relations); Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1147 
(1938).  Radin noted that 
the only legal fact . . . is a relation between two such human beings.  No relation 
that has legal relevance exists between a human being and a thing, between a 
human being and a group of other human beings considered as a group, nor 
between a human being and an abstract idea. 
Id. For contemporary appreciation of these conceptual changes, see GREGORY S. 
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN 
LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 310–23 (1997) (discussing the bundle of rights theory of 
property); J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1119, 1123 (1990) (proposing an application of Saussure’s and Peirce’s notions of 
semiotics to extend an understanding of Hohfeldian jural relations and the consequent 
impact on the thought of legal realists and fellow travelers of the critical legal studies 
movement); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the 
Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239, 283–301 (1994) (presenting a 
reevaluation of the bundle of rights theory of property). 
The concept of personality exhibited similar tension, in which the original conception 
of the person as coherent and immutable acceded to an understanding of the individual as 
relationally different, depending upon the context.  During this period the courts extended 
the designation and protection of legal personality to the corporate form, a move that 
engendered a wide-ranging discussion of the place of human selfhood in the law.  This 
assignment placed the corporate “individual” within the same ontological universe as the 
natural individual.  See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 409 
(1886).  See generally GRAY, supra note 32, at 20–32 (defending the inviolability of the 
notion of the cohesive person in jurisprudence and critiquing, as unnecessary, contemporary 
theories of streams of consciousness detailing the mutability of the self); OTTO GIERKE, 
POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE (Frederic William Maitland trans., 1958) 
(arguing, influentially, for conceiving the communal or group form of the modern 
corporation as a “natural entity” cohering in a like manner to the individual self); John 
Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 
(1926) (arguing for a conceptualization of the corporation as a set of relations rather than 
as a natural entity on par with the individual self); Harold J. Laski, The Personality of 
Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916) (discussing the ontological cohesion of 
corporations as separate personalities and comparing that to the legal understanding of 
associations); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253 
(1911) (discussing the corporation as an entity separate from its constituent members and 
worthy of naturalized legal personality).  This fragmentation of self and property led 
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that object of whiteness?36  Justice Brown’s insistence that Plessy had to 
“be a white man” in order to claim harm merely deferred the inquiry to a 
determination of the reasonableness of the reputational claim.37  
Containing the tensions between the presocial notion of identity and the 
relational quality of the self and property, the Court insisted that any 
claim of racial title in whiteness, of possession of the necessary object of 
blood quantum, required “reference to the established usages, customs 
and traditions of the people . . . [and to] ‘the general sentiment of the 
community.’”38  Thus, while the courts, following Plessy, treated 
whiteness as an object possessed, they determined the meaning of that 
object through its representation in the community, the very same means 
by which courts recognized and constructed reputation.39 
III.  THE RELATIONAL REGIME OF PROPERTY 
As courts during this period sought to fix and protect white racial 
identity by reference to “title” in the objects, elements, and 
characteristics of the individual body, a legal and cultural discourse 
emerged that articulated a reconceptualized consideration of property as 
composed of jural relations.40  Instead of relying on the certainty of the 
 
courts to yearn for an object by which to fix identity and property, and that object was 
blood quantum. 
 36. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 550–51 (quoting People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 
(1883)) (emphasis added). 
 39. Undermining the Court’s efforts was the reality that the legal measure of this 
racial certainty, and therefore the property value of a reputation in whiteness, lay not in 
the ineluctable shadows of biology, but in the volatility of social sentiment.  Plessy’s 
property interest in “passing” rested on an understanding of property not as an innate 
value separate from commerce, but as a constellation of perceptions derived from 
Plessy’s circulation in the public and social sphere, a notion consonant with William 
James’s 1891 observation that we are different individuals among different people.  
I JAMES, supra note 12, at 294.  In other words, Plessy’s property interest was a 
consequence of, and the condition for, the community belief that he was white.  Indeed, 
as Hohfeld observed in 1917, “[I]nstead of there being a single right with a single 
correlative duty resting on all the persons against whom the right avails, there are many 
separate and distinct rights, actual and potential, each one of which has a correlative duty 
resting upon some one person.”  Hohfeld II, supra note 35, at 742.  On property in the 
social sphere, see generally  MICHAEL T. GILMORE, AMERICAN ROMANTICISM AND THE 
MARKETPLACE (1985) (discussing the self and commodification); LENTRICCHIA, supra 
note 18, at 51 (discussing property and the self). 
 40. Hohfeld II, supra note 35, at 710–47.  Additionally, this rearrangement of the 
corpus of property, ascribing legal weight and substance of an object of attention to jural 
relations held by parties, echoed the analytical treatment of relations by American 
pragmatists, like William James, who observed, “[T]he relations that connect 
experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation 
experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system.”  William James, 
A World of Pure Experience, 1 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 533, 534 (1904) 
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object to convey legal value, an evolving logic of property insisted that 
ownership was a situational medley, involving a shifting set of social 
relationships.41  In this constellation, legal value emerged from, and 
varied according to, other persons’ legal interests in the object.42  In his 
late nineteenth-century treatise on the law of eminent domain, John 
Lewis articulated this contingent view of property when he admonished 
his readers to “look beyond the thing itself, beyond the mere corporeal 
object, for the true idea of property. . . .  The dullest individual among 
the people knows and understands that his property in anything is a 
bundle of rights.”43  One court conveyed the nature of this change when 
it observed in 1902: 
Property . . . is not, in its modern sense, confined to that which may be touched 
by the hand, or seen by the eye.  What is called tangible property has come to 
be . . . but the embodiment, physically, of an underlying life—a life that, in its 
contribution to success, is immeasurably more effective than the mere physical 
embodiment.44 
In his study of consciousness and personality, American pragmatist 
William James put the serial quality of property in psychological terms 
when, in 1890, he observed that “a man has as many social selves as 
there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in 
their mind.”45 
 
(proposing an appreciation of radical empiricism predicated on experience). 
 41. Hohfeld I, supra note 35, at 23–25 (discussing the false dichotomy between 
corporeal and incorporeal rights); see also WALTER LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY: AN 
ATTEMPT TO DIAGNOSE THE CURRENT UNREST 50–51 (1914) (examining the reorientation of 
the relationship between property and personality under the press of corporate capitalism). 
 42. The notion of property as a set of jural relations served to underscore the social 
and historic aspects of legal conceptions, for these relations expressed a past narrative of 
experience while also encompassing the future unfolding of events.  During this period, 
William James described the truth of a thing similarly, noting that “ideas . . . become true 
just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our 
experience.”  WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF 
THINKING, POPULAR LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY 34 (1907).  James conveyed the 
constituent quality of this relational conception of property when he perceived the truth  
of an idea as something that happens to the object, rather than something that resides in 
it, remarking, “It becomes true, is made true by events.  Its verity is in fact an event, a 
process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication.  Its validity is the 
process of its valid-ation.”  Id. at 58, 201. 
 43. I JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 63, 64, at 52, 55 (3d ed. 1909) (discussing property as a constituent relationship). 
 44. Nat’l Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1902) (finding 
that the information on ticker tape is not copyright matter but a commercial product). 
 45. I JAMES, supra note 12, at 294.  James acknowledged the proximity of property 
and personality when he remarked, immediately prior to this observation, “[I]t is clear 
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Thus, by 1932, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means might observe that 
the financial structure of the “quasi-public” corporation had “resulted 
[in] the dissolution of the old atom of ownership.”46  This assertion 
represented a remarkable testament to the decades-long re-creation and 
rearticulation of the attributes that formerly cohered in the singular 
property owner.  During this period legal discourse revealed a new 
apprehension of property as necessarily fragmented and diffuse: 
Property performed and gained meaning only through a constellation of 
social relationships, of rights, duties, privileges, powers, and immunities.  
Consequently, the abilities of property and personality, as conceptual 
frameworks for legal discourse, to legitimate judicial decisions, provide 
a basis for claims, and act as a referent for legal resolution yielded, 
instead, to a contested discourse concerning the meaning and value of 
property and personality itself, a discourse that treated both concepts as 
open questions in need of answers.47 
As the cohesive certainty of property had begun to fragment by 
matching and exceeding the collected demands of an increasingly 
corporate and mass culture predicated on wage labor, the preeminence of 
the moral personality predicated on independence through ownership of 
land yielded to an understanding of the serial and social self.  In 
response, the cultural practices of the law began to locate the source of 
individual independence not in landed property but as instantiated in the 
body of the person.  By relying on the rhetoric of blood quantum, with 
its implied purity of racial identity, courts relocated the object of 
property into the body in an effort to manifest racial certainty and avoid 
the contingency of the new property regime.48  The tension between an 
 
that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls mine the line is difficult to 
draw.”  Id. at 291; see also I RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR 
RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 132–99 (1914) (suggesting that a property 
right provides the exclusive control over some thing); Joseph W. Bingham, Some 
Suggestions Concerning “Legal Cause” at Common Law, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 30–36 
(1909) (proposing a serially relational conception of negligence based on the scope of 
duty owed and suggesting that it supplant the object-act notion of probable cause 
foundational to tort analysis). 
 46. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 7–8 (1940) (articulating a distinction between the possession and 
ownership of property as suggested by the modern corporate form).  Much of Berle’s and 
Means’s observations concerning the dissolution of property echoes economist Thorstein 
Veblen’s trenchant critique in The Theory of Business Enterprise.  THORSTEIN VEBLEN, 
THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 120–30 (1935) (discussing the tensions between 
traditional concepts of individual rights and personality and reconfigurations of those 
concepts under corporate enterprise). 
 47. See KERN supra note 17, at 50–77 (placing an emphasis on the mutability of 
notions of time, space, form, and distance in modern mass culture, inclusive of legal 
doctrine); LIPPMANN, supra note 41, at 50–51 (discussing the rearticulation of property 
and personality). 
 48. This gesture may be understood as an internalization of the late nineteenth-
DOUGLAS.DOC 1/9/2020  11:20 AM 
[VOL. 40:  881, 2003]  Constructing White Identity 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 899 
object-centered conception of property and the notion of property as 
serial and social emerged in the judicial discourse of race identification 
between the ontological certainty of blood quantum and the empiricism 
of proof through association and community sentiment.  Hanging in the 
balance was the understanding of selfhood, as either prior to the polis 
and possessing a singular moral personality, or as a condition of the 
community from which identity emerged.49 
In grappling with claims of racial misrepresentation, courts of the late 
nineteenth century sought to locate racial identity in the body in the form 
of an object of property—an immutable, natural “thing” possessed—to 
ensure a means for “quieting title” in whiteness.50  Working against the 
 
century populist promise of the moral personality written upon the fact of the body.  See 
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS 204–23 
(1991) (arguing that the populism of this period, manifest in several agrarian arenas, held 
out the promise of a moral personality conditioned upon earlier, cohesive forms of 
proprietorship, a promise born out of the republican reliance upon the freehold, the 
external object of desire, as the condition for the formation of the moral personality 
necessary for independent and uncorruptible civic participation).  Where the law 
recognized a certain form and capacity of the self embodied in the relationship to the 
appropriation of property as a “thing” that contained a person’s will, the fragmentation of 
property, its serial quality and the separation of ownership and control, invited an 
expansion in the possibilities of personhood.  The legal attention directed toward blood 
quantum and community sentiment represented an effort by the courts to suture together 
what they may have recognized as already fractured: the ownership and control of racial 
identity.  In this context it might be possible to suggest, in the language of the corporate 
reorganization of property, that Tourgee insisted not on ownership of, but on control 
over the racial property he recognized as possessed by Plessy because of the new 
apprehension of property as diffuse and fragmentary.  See JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 155–56 (1924) (applying Hohfeld’s proposition of jural 
relations to the legal creation of value in commerce); GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH 
HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 40–41 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967) (discussing the 
creation of objects as human activity, the product of continuously articulated desire); 
ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE, INTRODUCTION TO THE READING OF HEGEL 3–70 (James H. Nichols, 
Jr. trans., Allan Bloom ed., 1969) (arguing for a reading of Hegel that appreciates the 
development of the modern personality as participating in the creation of objects as the 
articulation of desire). 
 49. The reconstruction of property as a set of jural relations implied that the moral 
personality of the autonomous freeholder had been excluded from cultural and legal 
sovereignty, or that its rational coherence was at least open to debate.  The fixed 
character of that personality did little to explain or contain new demands on identity. 
 50. In the judicial treatment of chattel slavery prior to 1865, the courts wrestled 
with the ontological slippage between property and personality assigned to the body of 
the bonded slave.  Prior to emancipation, courts sought to contain the subjectivity of the 
slave by limiting the judicial opportunity to recognize personality, marking the slave 
body as an object rather than as a subject.  However, this legally designated property 
continuously erupted as subjectivity, calling the very legal assignment into question.  See 
generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
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backdrop of state laws stipulating blood quantum for establishing the 
boundaries of racial meaning, courts at both the federal and state level 
deployed the language of entitlement and the legal convictions of 
property to represent blood quantum as an immutable characteristic 
inscribing the racial self.51  Yet this legal posture only revisited and re-
 
PROCESS (1975) (examining the judiciary’s moral and constitutional responsibility, 
during the antebellum period, for resisting enforcement of fugitive slave statutes in 
conflict with state imposed laws); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE 
WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1976) (discussing the law’s effect in disrupting the line 
between person as subject and person as property under the regime of slavery in the 
American South); Saks, supra note 26, at 43 (discussing white identity as property 
possessed).  Under the discursive regime of slavery, in which courts treated the 
relationship between property and personality as a metaphorical equivalency of object to 
subject, property retained its cohesive construction, and notions of personality mimicked 
that cohesion.  Severing the legal, metaphorical relationship of person as chattel created 
the space for a new ontological assignment, in which courts and legislative bodies 
worked to mark personality through the designation of an object of property within the 
body.  This new apprehension of the relationship between property and personality as a 
metonymic assignment of part to whole, with blood quantum representing racial identity, 
effectively resulted in the verification of the right to the moral personality of whiteness 
through judicial readings of appearance, comportment, association, genealogy, and 
performance.  Together, this constellation provided the means for claiming property in 
whiteness, a constellation of attributes that resonated with the notion of property 
conceived of as a bundle of sticks.  As such, it may be possible to suggest that the turn 
away from a unitary conception of property, as enunciated in such notions as the bundle 
of sticks concept, required the severance of a metaphorical treatment of the body as 
property found deployed in the law against African Americans until 1865.  For a 
discussion of the explanatory register of the tropes of metaphor and metonymy, see 
HAYDEN WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM 5–7, 206, 253 
(1978) (following Kenneth Burke and proposing a tropological reading of grammar that 
takes into account differences of meaning between the tropes of metaphor and 
metonymy, where the latter trope, as represented by the discursive maneuver of enabling 
a part, such as blood quantum, to represent a whole, the whiteness of a body, also 
endows the attribute with purposive activity and agency, thereby replacing cause with 
effect, permitting, for example, the conceptualization that “white” blood creates or 
causes white identity rather than representing the attribute of “white” blood as the 
residual effect of the designation of white identity). 
 51. The legal stipulation of blood quantum for white selfhood provides an 
interesting twist on Kenneth Burke’s observation that a metonymic rhetoric of part and 
whole was central to the critique of modernization.  KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF 
MOTIVES 500–17 (1945) (proposing an understanding of linguistic meaning through the 
grammatical strategies of reading).  Burke explained the trope of metonymy as 
instantiating “some incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the corporeal or tangible.”  
Id. at 506.  Reducing whiteness to blood quantum represented just such a telescoping 
maneuver in legal discourse, as courts treated blood quantum as a material embodiment 
of an intangible white selfhood.  Wai Chee Dimock has characterized the cultural 
relation between the material part and the immaterial whole expressed in metonymic 
tropes as “crucial both to the making of entities, the categorization of autonomous units, 
and to the making of epistemologies, the projection of a cognitive universe.”  Wai Chee 
Dimock, Class, Gender, and a History of Metonymy, in RETHINKING CLASS: LITERARY 
STUDIES AND SOCIAL FORMATIONS 57, 59 (Wai Chee Dimock & Michael T. Gilmore 
eds., 1994) (finding a metonymic discourse in readings of law and literature).  To couch 
this in terms of this discussion, it is through metonymy that the idea of the white person 
equated with the physical detail of the white person, making the white body virtually 
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created the tension found in Plessy between property as simultaneously 
object and subject, as possessed and represented, as both a thing and a 
set of social relations, expressed through the “general sentiment of the 
community.”52  Efforts to grapple with these questions helped to 
comprise a legal discourse of the early twentieth century that should not 
be viewed as merely reaction to the conceptual formalisms of the 
nineteenth century, nor as quests for the object or method in scientific 
rationality, but might best be appreciated as crucial attempts to articulate 
a legal legitimacy consonant with new apprehensions of the self and of 
property—efforts, in short, to comprehend the moral personality under 
the aegis of modernity.53 
For Justice Brown, whiteness understood as an entitlement through the 
possession of blood quantum represented an effort to maneuver the long-
held association of property and objectivity, in the service of racial 
certainty, to arrest the indeterminacy of racial identification.  Under the 
Court’s rubric, whiteness was the effect of possessing the objectively 
 
coextensive with white selfhood as an epistemological category.  This coextension 
resulted from a collapse of the immaterial into the material, in which jurists strove to 
contain whiteness by establishing a legal narrative of reductive equivalency; they 
recognized white selves because they possessed white blood.  This metonymic discourse 
operated not only to materialize the idea of white selfhood, but also to localize and 
contain the object of that idea within a narrative of modern individualism.  The irony, or 
in Burke’s phrase, the “internal fatality” of this assignment emerged from the double 
gesture required of the courts, in which blood quantum, as material phantasm, entailed 
further representation through evidence of lineage, family narrative, community opinion, 
appearance, comportment, and association.  BURKE, supra, at 512.  Rather than embodying 
the idea of whiteness and localizing it in the individual body, the legal narrative of blood 
quantum burst judicial efforts of containment by registering the proof of white identity as 
observable social equivalencies.  Courts thus authorized whiteness through a series of 
atomizing and fragmenting exchange relationships in which social markers such as 
association or appearance stood in for the invisible but “material” blood quantum.  
Consequently, judicial fidelity to formal notions of legal certainty and a desire to locate 
that certainty in the objectivity of blood quantum served to fragment rather than contain 
whiteness, creating the very possibility of and means for misrecognition and passing.  
For a discussion of the closure of identity, see POSNOCK supra note 16, at 105; TAYLOR, 
supra note 16, at 159–76 (discussing a subject’s radical stance of disengagement, of 
objective distancing, from the self for the purpose of remaking as a quintessentially 
modern attribute and referring to this stance as the “punctual self”); see also HAYDEN 
WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE 
31–38, 335–360 (1973) (discussing the grammar of metonymy as imparting an agency or 
causal relationship between parts and wholes). 
 52. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 53. See TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 310–12 (discussing the modern personality); see 
also KOLB, supra note 16, at 3–19, 244–46 (discussing modern identity); LIVINGSTON, 
supra note 16, at 220–24 (discussing the modern personality as thought and thing). 
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proper blood quantum, thus staunching the possibility that whiteness, as 
a valuable property form, would derive that value from any source other 
than the object of blood possessed.54  Yet, as state legislatures and courts 
associated whiteness with the objectivity of blood quantum, the laws 
delimiting racial identity did not so much arrest or prohibit 
transgressions across the color line as they created and reproduced the 
conditions for redefining race as the very possibility of passing.55 
IV.  REPUTATION AND THE SOCIAL SELF 
Courts addressing a private injury to reputation might do so under the 
legal doctrine of defamation.56  Late nineteenth-century commentators 
on the law of libel and slander in the United States differed over whether 
the gist of a defamatory action turned on an injury to reputation or on the 
assertion of a pecuniary loss.57  Rather than a mere legal nicety, the basis 
of this distinction signaled alternative views of identity that defamation 
law sought to protect.58  While both views relied on an understanding of 
reputation as a social or community expression of selfhood, regulating 
that reputation by measuring it as a pecuniary loss determined the value 
of identity primarily in relation to a cash nexus.59  Thus, the social 
 
 54. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549. 
 55. As the requisite blood quantum served as the metonymic device by which 
courts “found” racial property in the person, the invisibility of blood as a racial signifier 
required another gesture of representation for the effective apprehension of legal 
categories of race.  That second gesture required the presentation of the self within a 
community.  Consequently, legal efforts to ensure the certainty of the racial self through 
the biological objectivity of blood actually created the cultural conditions for racial self-
refashioning.  See Peggy Pascoe, Race, Gender and the Privileges of Property: On the 
Significance of Miscegenation Law in the U.S. West, in OVER THE EDGE: REMAPPING THE 
AMERICAN WEST 215 (Valerie J. Matsumoto & Blake Allmendinger eds., 1999) 
(discussing miscegenation law and probate). 
 56. Historically, defamation addressed three elements: the form of the publication 
(whether verbal or written), the character of the matter, and the motives for dissemination.  
Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation I, 3 COLUM. L. 
REV. 546, 571 (1903) [hereinafter Veeder I]; Van Vechten Veeder, The History and 
Theory of the Law of Defamation II, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 33, 35 (1904) [hereinafter Veeder 
II] (tracing the growth and development of defamation law in England and the United 
States); see also NEWELL, supra note 12, at 68–84 (discussing the law of defamation). 
 57. See NEWELL, supra note 12, at 966–71 (discussing libel and slander of 
reputation); W. BLAKE ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 18–20 (3d 
ed. 1896) (discussing defamation law principally in England); JOHN TOWNSHEND, A 
TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND LIBEL 37–50 (4th ed. 1890) (asserting 
that pecuniary loss must be shown to entitle a petitioner to a remedy).  See generally 
THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCANDALUM MAGNATUM, 
AND FALSE RUMORS (1832) (treating cases in both England and the United States). 
 58. See NEWELL, supra note 12, at 195–97, 849–72 (discussing special damages 
relating to business loss and the loss of honor). 
 59. This often amounted to a discussion of whether a showing of special damages was 
required, where a known pecuniary loss did not necessitate such a showing.  Id. at 849–72. 
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expression of the self largely carried legal weight to the degree the 
market might augment that expression by registering the loss of business 
opportunity, clients, or professional position.60 
Alternatively, exercising defamation law to protect an injury to 
reputation absent evidence of pecuniary loss relied on a wider, if not 
entirely different, economy of community sentiment.61  In this economy, 
turn-of-the-century jurors assigned value to reputation by brandishing 
the yardstick of community norms to measure any loss to the value of 
the social expression of the self by reference to honor, prejudice, belief, 
and expectation.62  Knit together, these intangible reference points for 
community sentiment provided reputational claims with the tangible, 
legal weight of a worldly object.  This transformation was not lost on 
one commentator who, in 1903, observed that “[o]ne’s good name is 
therefore as truly the product of one’s efforts as any physical possession; 
indeed, it alone gives to material possessions their value as sources of 
happiness.”63  Thus, reputation was no less a part of the production 
process, no less proprietary and no less tangible because it operated 
within the cultural economy of community sentiment.64  Reputation, as a 
 
 60. Id. at 168–98 (discussing defamation in offices, profession, and trades); see 
also Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 183 S.W. 269, 274 (Ky. 1916) 
(discussing a corporation as equivalent to a merchant or tradesman in the type of harm it 
might claim when initiating a libel suit); HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR BUSINESS 
COMPETITION 389–420 (1909) (discussing libel and slander of the corporation).  While 
Nims focuses on defamation of trade, it is important to note that with the advent, during 
this period, of a mass market advertising that sought to align identity with commercial 
product, trade libel began to look like character libel, enabling a broadening of the 
concept of reputational injury in commerce.  See generally JACKSON LEARS, FABLES OF 
ABUNDANCE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICA (1994) (discussing the 
shift in advertising from the promotion of the product to the selling of an identity that 
necessitated the product). 
 61. See GEORGE A. LOFTON, CHARACTER SKETCHES 76–77 (1890) (noting that “few 
ever override popular odium and disfavor” created by the “sting” of slander); NEWELL, 
supra note 12, at 966–71 (discussing defamation as protecting the place of personal 
reputation in the community); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: 
Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 701 (1986) (discussing the social 
linkages crucial to an appreciation of the application of defamation law). 
 62. See Morris v. State, 160 S.W. 387, 388 (Ark. 1913) (finding that the 
defendant’s comment that the plaintiff’s mother was a black woman effectively removed 
the community’s respect in remanding for a new trial); O’Connor v. Dallas Cotton Exch., 153 
S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. App. 1941) (finding that the plaintiff could recover from a building 
owner for the “pain and humiliation” of riding a freight elevator with African Americans). 
 63. Veeder II, supra note 56, at 34 (recognizing reputation as infusing objects with 
the  subjectivity of the self). 
 64. See NEWELL, supra note 12, at 77–84 (discussing harm to reputation). 
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proprietary expression of the social self, yielded new ways of regulating 
and expressing the self, consonant with the new expressions of property 
that were accommodating and shaping the requirements of a nascent 
corporate and consumer economy.65 
In the law of defamation, judges sought to administer a set of rules 
regarding expression—whether written, spoken, imputed through gesture 
or representation—considered harmful to the reputation of an individual 
and to justify the remedial attention of the law.66  American common law 
developed categories of defamation that enabled judges to recognize 
remarks as per se harmful to one’s standing in the community.67  Judges 
found words per se harmful where the law presumed, without express 
proof, that the nature of the words themselves, on their faces, must have 
injured the plaintiff’s reputation.68  The common law treated the written 
word, when published or disseminated in some printed form, as libelous 
when the petitioner proved “special damages” of a pecuniary loss to 
receive compensation for injury to reputation.69  On the other hand, 
injury to reputation through spoken words or gestures amounted to 
slander, which the courts recognized as per se harmful to the extent the 
defamation represented a categorically unacceptable utterance, such as 
imputing the commission of a crime, attributing contamination with a 
contagious disease, or disparaging a person in office, profession, or 
trade.70  While commentators differed over the efficacy of the common-
law distinction between the written and spoken word, most generally 
 
 65. The proliferation of new property forms, such as business goodwill and 
trademarks in a person’s name and face, along with the application of property to actions 
such as the labor injunction yielded, and could only have emerged from, a fragmented or 
serial notion of property.  See COMMONS, supra note 48, at 1–45 (discussing business 
goodwill); JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW 
1–41 (1991) (discussing the multiplication of legal instruments and approaches for 
addressing the personality attributes of the body that accompanied the rise in mass and 
corporate culture); Grey, supra note 9, at 69–73 (discussing the myriad forms of property). 
 66. See NEWELL, supra note 12, at 33–84 (discussing the elements of libel and slander). 
 67. See id. at 849–56 (discussing the categories in which a showing of special 
damages is considered largely unnecessary: libel action, imputing an indictable offense, 
contagious disease, or disparaging the person in profession, trade, or office of public 
trust, want of chastity, adultery, or fornication). 
 68. See id. at 849 (discussing per se harm). 
 69. Id. at 43.  Newell observed: 
Any written words are defamatory which impute to the plaintiff that he has 
been guilty of any crime, fraud, dishonesty, immorality, vice or dishonorable 
conduct, or has been accused or suspected of any such misconduct; or which 
suggest that the plaintiff is suffering from any infectious disorder; or which 
have a tendency to injure him in his office, profession, calling or trade.  And 
so, too, are all words which hold the plaintiff up to contempt, hatred, scorn or 
ridicule, and which, by thus engendering an evil opinion of him in the minds of 
right-thinking men, tend to deprive him of friendly intercourse and society. 
Id. 
 70. See id. at 84 (discussing categories of per se harm). 
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regarded a published and printed defamation as more injurious to 
personal and professional reputation in its threat of permanency and 
dissemination than the presumed ephemera of speech.71 
Legal treatises on libel and slander published during the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century enumerated these categories.72  
Because the harm to reputation that an utterance might cause depended 
on whom it was directed toward and the specific accusation in the 
community, courts faced a litany of considerations.73  For instance, 
judges had to consider whether the words were directed at a public 
official, clergyman, lawyer, doctor, journalist, or general trader; they had 
to discover which particular criminal offense might be imputed, from 
cheating, counterfeiting, gaming, and kidnapping to robbery, subornation, 
or watering milk; when a specific moral impropriety was averred, courts 
had to ascertain whether it involved rape, incest, sodomy, soliciting, 
adultery, fornication, or prostitution.74  Thus, courts might not consider it 
slanderous per se to refer to a lawyer as a crank or as insane, but they did 
consider it actionable to impute that a lawyer abandoned clients.75 
Nevertheless, for courts to regard spoken words not falling within one 
of the enumerated categories as defamatory required a showing of 
“special damages”: material evidence shown at a trial establishing the 
financial injury visited upon the person’s reputation.76  As one treatise 
 
 71. Veeder I, supra note 56, at 571–73 (distinguishing between libel and slander in 
terms of the relative permanence, as an object in print, of libel); see also NEWELL, supra 
note 12, at 43 (finding the harm of libel in its enduring quality, as opposed to the 
evanescent nature of slander).  But see LOFTON, supra note 61, at 76 (insisting that 
slander’s evanescent quality made it more difficult to contain and therefore more 
dangerous).  Characterizing slander as “infinitely worse than theft or murder or arson,” 
Lofton laments, “Such is the eager love of scandal, so innumerable, doubtful, and 
irresponsible are its sources among the masses, that it is almost next to impossible to win 
a suit for damages or to criminally prosecute the slanderer.”  Id. at 76–77.  Disrupting the 
effective categorical differences between libel and slander, between the subjective utterance 
and the objective publication, as courts did in cases of racial misrecognition, ironically 
mimicked the eroding distinction between the very categories of subject and object, the 
distinct integrity of which the courts relied upon to justify the certainty of racial identity. 
 72. See NEWELL, supra note 12, at 93–201 (discussing the enumerated categories 
of harm). 
 73. See id. at 270–358, 388–561 (discussing the construction of the averred 
harmful language). 
 74. ODGERS, supra note 57, at 18–22 (discussing both American and British 
examples of special damages in a widely circulated and often cited treatise). 
 75. See NEWELL, supra note 12, at 184–86 (discussing degrees of defamation in 
relationship to possible pecuniary consequences). 
 76. See id. at 849–72 (discussing slander). 
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writer explained in 1881, “[W]ords which are merely uncivil, words of 
idle abuse, are clearly no ground for an action, unless it can be shown 
that in fact some appreciable damage to the plaintiff has followed from 
their use.”77  However, bringing another’s name into disrepute not only 
implicated a property dimension to reputation, but also involved intangible 
considerations of honor and dignity, crucial markers of one’s place in a 
community.78  Southern courts constructed a separate category in 
defamation involving racial misrecognition, a category in which courts 
sought to etch the color line so indelibly as to create instant harm and 
ready remedy for misapprehending another’s racial identity.79  Involving 
as it did issues of property, honor, and identity, southern courts almost 
universally treated racial misrepresentation as a per se harm whether 
sounding in libel or slander.80 
The legal construction of a right in reputation also articulated and 
inscribed notions of community and locality.  When judges recognized a 
specific person’s reputation as a property interest vulnerable to harm, 
they did so by reference to an imaginary community to which the person 
belonged, one that recognized the claimant’s reputation as worthy of 
legal protection.81  One’s reputation always existed within a community, 
and the legal decisions recognizing harm or ignoring injury in 
defamation constructed and reinforced an imaginary community in 
which that reputation might garner evidentiary weight.82  That the law 
might, for instance, recognize as harmful a statement impugning a 
 
 77. ODGERS, supra note 57, at 18 (discussing the need to show special damages). 
 78. See Veeder II, supra note 56, at 33–42 (discussing reputation and community 
standing). 
 79. See infra notes 117–85 and accompanying text. 
 80. See, e.g., Bowen v. Indep. Publ’g Co., 96 S.E.2d 564, 566 (S.C. 1957) (finding 
recovery necessary when a white woman sued a paper for publishing the news that her 
son had been transferred to a government hospital and naming her as the mother in the 
paper’s section on “Negro news” beneath the picture of a “colored soldier”).  As 
petitioners and courts made common cause to establish the ineluctable line of racial 
identity, judicial decisions served to reinscribe social divisions seemingly beyond the 
competence of the courts to address, while also baldly acknowledging a broad absence of 
harm.  As the court opined in Bowen: 
Although to publish in a newspaper of a white woman that she is a Negro 
imputes no mental, moral or physical fault for which she may justly be held 
accountable to public opinion, yet in view of the social habits and customs 
deep-rooted in this State, such publication is calculated to affect her standing 
in society and to injure her in the estimation of her friends and acquaintances. 
Id. 
 81. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN 
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 1–4 (rev. ed. 1991) (examining the cultural and political 
linkages that have generated national community as an aspirational and regulative ideal); 
WILSON, supra note 22, at 45–70 (discussing interpretive communities). 
 82. See Post, supra note 61, at 700–10 (discussing the constitutive role of the 
community in forming reputation). 
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trader’s honesty relied on the court’s implied construction of a 
community of traders in which the principles of cohesion rested on a 
culture of fair dealing, personal integrity, and face-to-face transactions.83  
Equivalently, during this period, courts in many states recognized a 
defamatory imputation that a woman had given birth to an illegitimate 
child as actionable per se.84  The courts predicated their willingness to 
find such per se harm on the expectations of a constructed community in 
which a woman’s chastity stood as the hallmark of her reputation.85 
Similarly, legal exclusions, or nonrecognition of harm, also served to 
articulate the meaning of the community.86  As a result, legal recognition 
of reputation always implicated and created a larger social whole that 
courts determined and divided through community considerations of 
status, race, and gender.  As one legal commentator remarked in 1903, in 
reflecting on the law’s obligation to remedy defamatory harm: 
[T]he right to reputation . . . has regard . . . to that repute which is slowly built 
up by integrity, honorable conduct, and right living. . . .  [I]t is reputation, not 
character, which the law aims to protect.  Character is what a person really is; 
reputation is what he seems to be.  One is composed of the sum of the principles 
and motives—be they known or unknown—which govern his conduct.  The 
other is the result of observation of his conduct—the character imputed to him 
by others.  It is, therefore, reputation alone that is vulnerable . . . .87 
Reputation resulted from the extension and elaboration of social 
recognition; it was not a possession of individuals but a relation between 
 
 83. See NEWELL, supra note 12, at 195–97, 707–10 (discussing commercial reputation). 
 84. See Bowden v. Bailes, 8 S.E. 342, 345 (N.C. 1888) (stating that “any words, 
written or spoken, of a woman, which may amount to a charge of incontinency, shall be 
actionable,” whether or not spoken “wantonly” or “maliciously”) (citing N.C. Code § 
3763); Roe v. Chitwood, 36 Ark. 210, 212 (1880) (confirming that accusing a married 
woman of being no better than a “base whore” is a charge of adultery sufficient without 
an allegation of special damages from the claimant); Jones v. Gill, 66 P.2d 1033, 1034–
35 (Kan. 1937) (reversing the damage award for the plaintiff and remanding for a new trial 
a suit involving a mother’s claim that rumors of the racial composition of her adopted 
daughter—that she was “a half-breed child,” which forced plaintiff to move her family to 
several different neighborhoods to escape the accusations—were started by the plaintiff’s 
stepmother-in-law); NEWELL, supra note 12, at 151–66 (discussing adultery and fornication). 
 85. Nicholson v. Merritt, 59 S.W. 25, 26 (Ky. 1900) (stating that, “Has one of 
Griff Nicholson’s girls had a young one?  I heard it,” is a charge of fornication and 
therefore actionable per se). 
 86. See infra notes 108–15, 187–93 and accompanying text. 
 87. Veeder II, supra note 56, at 33 (proposing the nineteenth-century conceit 
concerning identity in distinguishing between character as innate and coherent and 
reputation as social construction). 
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persons.88  The relative weight courts assigned to any given reputation 
rested on the judiciary’s willingness to recognize an individual as 
belonging to the community implied and constructed by the courts.89 
V.  REPUTATION AS PROPERTY 
While the legal right of reputation always implicated the community, 
courts recognized that individuals claiming defamatory harm sought to 
fortify and redefine property value in the social self.  The judicial 
treatment of defamation indicates that during this period claims to the 
right of reputation sought to protect at least two types of interest: honor 
and property in the self. 
Seeking to make the distinction clear, Roscoe Pound remarked in 1915: 
   On the one hand [defamation] may be an injury to personality affecting the 
feelings, the sensibilities, the honor of the person defamed.  On the other hand it 
may be an injury to substance, since credit plays so large a part in society that 
the confidence of one’s fellows may be a valuable asset.90 
Reputation, then, resonated with two fairly disparate, but inseparable 
meanings—honor and “substance.”  Even Pound admitted that, while he 
considered the interest involved when a person is humiliated as one of 
honor rather than of “substance,” he nevertheless recognized that a claim in 
such an instance amounted to no more than one of property in the name.91 
Honor relied on a system of stratification and status that conveyed 
 
 88. Of course, in the eyes of the Plessy Court and other jurists who attempted to 
contain the possibility of race as a free-floating signifier, reputation exhibited a 
community’s expression of the nascent and immutable character of an individual.  See 
SUSMAN, supra note 20, at 276–84 (distinguishing between character and personality and 
discussing the development of the latter notion of identity as a condition and 
consequence of the modern self, especially under the terms of mass culture). 
 89. See infra notes 103–19 and accompanying text. 
 90. Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to 
Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 641 (1915) (noting that defamation “may be an 
injury to personality . . . [or] an injury to substance, since credit plays so large a part in 
society that the confidence of one’s fellows may be a valuable asset”).  Pound takes his 
cue on reputation as property from Bower’s code of actionable defamation: 
In so far . . . as individual honor, dignity, character, and reputation are recognized 
by the law as proper subjects of its protection and as being such that any injury 
thereto entitles the aggrieved party to the same forms of legal redress as the 
invasion of property strictly so called, it is permissible to consider these rights 
as assets . . . . 
Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 446 (1915) [hereinafter 
Pound, Interests of Personality] (quoting GEORGE SPENCER BOWER, A CODE OF THE LAW 
OF ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 240, 241 (1908)).  “Individual interests may be classified 
as (a) interests of personality,—the individual physical and spiritual existence; (b) 
domestic interests,—‘the expanded individual life;’ and (c) interests of substance,—the 
individual economic life.”  Id. at 349 (footnote omitted). 
 91. Pound, Interests of Personality, supra note 90, at 347. 
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social value.92  Construing reputation as honor, therefore, implied that 
identity was importantly linked to social status and, according to one 
observer, “presupposes an image of society in which ascribed social 
roles are pervasive and well established, and in which such roles provide 
the point of reference both for the ascription of social status and for the 
normative standards of personal conduct.”93  Thus, harm to reputation 
occurred when words threatened to remove an individual from the 
community, causing that person to be “shunned or avoided,” “to bring 
him into contempt among honorable persons,” to have the tendency “to 
put him without the pale of social intercourse,” or to “expose him to the 
public hatred, contempt, and ridicule.”94 
 
 92. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 185–90 (H.H. Gerth 
& C. Wright Mills eds. and trans., 1968) (discussing honor and social subordination). 
 93. Post, supra note 61, at 701 (footnote omitted).  For discussions on the 
intersection of defamation and community standing, see generally ROBERT BELLAH ET 
AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 100–10 (1985) (examining the tensions in American culture 
between utilitarian individualism and community relatedness in the development of the 
self); HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966) (examining 
group libel as a First Amendment concern in the context of civil rights actions); NORMAN 
L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF 
LIBEL 178–234 (1986) (discussing historical trends in public law of libel in northern 
courts); Alfred H. Kelly, Constitutional Liberty and the Law of Libel: A Historian’s 
View, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 429 (1968); Andrew J. King, The Law of Slander in Early 
Antebellum America, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1991) (discussing the origins of slander); 
David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. 
REV. 727, 750–80 (1942) (drawing connections between group libel claims and group 
entity theories); David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair 
Comment I,  42 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (1942) (surveying group libel techniques); David 
Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1282 (1942) (same); Donald Roper, James Kent and the Emergence of New York’s 
Libel Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 223, 225 (1973) (discussing libel law as a constraint 
on nineteenth-century press freedoms); Joseph Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CORNELL 
L.Q. 261 (1950) (examining and critiquing group defamation). 
 94. See Morris v. Evans, 95 S.E. 385, 386 (Ga. Ct. App. 1918) (“shunned or 
avoided”); Mankins v. State, 57 S.W. 950, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900) (“contempt 
among honorable persons”); Fitzpatrick v. Age-Herald Pub. Co., 63 So. 980, 982 (Ala. 
1913) (“without the pale of social intercourse”); Ottero v. Ewing, 110 So. 648, 651 (La. 
1926) (“public hatred, contempt, and ridicule”).  
Arkansas libel law, under section 1856 of Kirby’s Digest, read as follows: 
It shall be deemed slander to falsely use, utter or publish words which, in their 
common acceptation, shall amount to charge any person with having been 
guilty of any other crime or misdemeanor not mentioned in this act, or to 
charge any person with having been guilty of any dishonest business or official 
conduct or transaction, the effect of which charge would be to injure the credit 
or business standing, or to bring into disrepute the good name or character of 
such person so slandered, and such words so spoken shall be actionable, and 
the person so falsely publishing, speaking or uttering the same shall be deemed 
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While this form of social severance certainly implicated reputation 
understood as honor or “personality” in Pound’s terminology, it just as 
certainly provided for an understanding of reputation as property.  The 
courts recognized that society did not merely ascribe reputation, but that 
one’s “good name,” like goodwill, might be the result of personal 
exertion.95  Viewing reputation as property presumed a set of 
marketplace linkages between people, in which good character might be 
understood as a form of capital resulting from the labors of self-creation. 
Thus, by 1895, Albion Tourgee’s insistence that reputation was 
property seemed already familiar.  As a burgeoning marketplace 
participated in the proliferation of property forms in corporations, 
goodwill, and labor injunctions, and as reliance on reputation increased 
with the relative anonymity accompanying urban growth, immigration,  
and geographic mobility, courts came to agree with Tourgee’s 
assessment that one’s reputation might provide the “golden door of 
opportunity” and must therefore be guarded as a valuable asset.96  One 
prominent treatise writer at the time went so far as to argue that 
reputation is only property and not personality, reasoning that 
“pecuniary loss to the plaintiff is the gist of the action for slander or 
libel” and that where the law protects reputation “it does so indirectly, 
by means of a fiction—an assumption of pecuniary loss. . . .  [T]he 
action . . . is always for the pecuniary injury, and not for the injury to the 
 
guilty of slander, and punished accordingly. 
Morris v. Evans, 160 S.W. 387, 388 (Ark. 1913); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 
1441 (West 1980). 
Libel is a false or malicious unprivileged publication by writing, printing, 
picture, or effigy or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any 
person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or which tends to 
deprive him of public confidence, or to injure him in his occupation, or any 
malicious publication as aforesaid, designed to blacken or vilify the memory of 
one who is dead, and tending to scandalize his surviving relatives or friends. 
Id. 
 95. See Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 58 S.E. 899, 901–02 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907) 
(overruling the defendant’s demurrer and allowing the plaintiff’s suit to proceed by 
finding that the railway conductor’s efforts to seat the plaintiff in the rear section of the 
railcar “impute[d] the odium of illegitimacy”); Michaelson v. Turk, 90 S.E. 395, 398–
401 (W. Va. 1916) (discussing the connection between honor, reputation, and property in 
one’s good name in the context of common-law defamation and statutory slander). 
 96. Brief for the Plaintiff at 9, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210); 
see also Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) (rate case); 
Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (rate case); 
WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 85–
88 (1991) (tracing the development of the labor injunction as a property right protected 
by the Supreme Court from the late nineteenth through the early twentieth century); 
LIPPMANN, supra note 41, at 50–51 (discussing the fragmentation in the concept of 
property with the rise of the trust); SUSMAN, supra note 20, at 276–84 (discussing the 
shifting reliance on reputation). 
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reputation.”97  The judicial treatment of reputation as property implied 
that just as property assumed many forms, so might reputation; the 
malleability of property suggested the plasticity and possibility of 
personality expressed through reputation.  The legal equation of 
reputation and property during this period signaled the increasing 
commodification of personal identity while presenting the conditions, as 
Tourgee suggested, for protecting reputation that placed one’s standing 
in a social milieu infused with race, gender, and class distinctions.98 
VI.  WHITENESS AS A REPUTATIONAL CLAIM 
Northern courts more often recognized and required a pecuniary loss 
to legitimate damages for any harm to a person’s reputation.99  Courts in 
southern states,100 on the other hand, exhibited both a broader sense of 
which words might cause defamatory harm and a narrower sense of 
 
 97. TOWNSHEND, supra note 57, at 45–47 (discussing nineteenth-century 
defamation treatise); see also BOWER, supra note 90, at 275 (“For purposes of the civil 
law of defamation, reputation is regarded as a species of property.”).  See generally 
Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law, 43 AM. L. REV. 29 
(1909) (discussing reputation and standing in relationship to racial identity). 
 98. For a discussion of the cultural resistance to the commodification of identity, see 
T.J. JACKSON LEARS, NO PLACE OF GRACE: ANTIMODERNISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN CULTURE, 1880–1920, at 14–45 (1981) (discussing the antimodernist effort to 
contain the dissipating effect of mass culture on modern subjectivity and the consequent 
rise of therapeutic culture); see also WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS, 
POWER, AND THE RISE OF A NEW AMERICAN CULTURE 3–30 (1993) (placing desire at the 
center of the development of modern subjectivity in tracing the transforming effects of 
mass culture); LIVINGSTON, supra note 16, at 220 (critiquing the antimodernist narrative of 
the fragmentation of modern subjectivity as a declensionist tale of tragedy, which ignores 
possibilities for democratic participation contained in the promise of a constructed self).  
The republican ideal of individual independence and moral personality located in the 
proprietary freehold acceded to new cultural constructions of identity consonant with an 
emerging economy predicated on wage labor.  Jurists replicated and reinforced these 
changes when they located the moral personality of citizenship—the object of whiteness—
in the body, thus facilitating the move from a proprietary to a wage economy. 
 99. BOWER, supra note 90, at 279 (discussing the judicial interest in the financial 
impact of defamation); TOWNSHEND, supra note 57, at 50 (discussing pecuniary loss as a 
criteria for defamation cases). 
 100. The appellate cases involving defamatory harm when a reputed white person 
claimed racial misrecognition arose in the following states: South Carolina, Mississippi, 
Georgia, Oklahoma, Texas, Alabama, Virginia, West Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, 
Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, and North Carolina.  Of the defamation cases brought 
under the same charge in the North (in Illinois, Ohio, and New York) during this period, 
none succeeded.  See, e.g., Kenworthy v. Brown, 92 N.Y.S. 34, 35 (Gen. Term 1904) 
(holding that words charging a woman with being a “half-negress” were not slanderous 
per se as imputing lack of chastity). 
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whose reputation received evidentiary weight.  As former bonded 
Africans gained de jure political equivalency, southern judges and state 
legislatures fashioned new categories of per se defamatory harm,101 
categories that generated and reinscribed whiteness as status and 
property while simultaneously excluding any legal claim of reputation 
for blacks.102  While southern courts, like their northern counterparts, 
located harm to reputation in loss to property, they also assessed injury 
to honor and dignity.103  Indeed, southern courts wove the dual concern 
for personality and property together, forming a legal idiom in which 
reputation appeared as an honor that could be protected as a property 
interest in the self.  In the southern legal cosmos, in short, the law of 
defamation protected white identity as property; thus, honor and 
property flexed the same legal muscle to define the meaning of white 
subjectivity. 
In this regard the law was not merely consonant with southern culture; 
courts actually created the value in white honor and white subjectivity 
by etching racial boundaries around the right of reputation in 
whiteness.104  By finding defamatory harm when a white person was 
 
 101. The location of moral personality as an object within the body, as whiteness, 
rather than externally, as a proprietary freehold, required the demise of the de jure status 
of slavery with its accompanying metaphorical equivalency of person with property. 
 102. See Stephenson, supra note 97, at 46–52 (discussing per se defamatory harm).  
Certainly, many cases of racial misrecognition did not involve judicial proceedings.  Ray 
Stannard Baker recounts one such instance, occurring in Albany, Georgia in 1907 and 
reported in the Atlanta Georgian, as follows: 
Peter Zeigler, a Negro, was last night escorted out of town by a crowd of white 
men.  Zeigler had been here for a month and palmed himself off as a white 
man.  He has been boarding with one of the best white families in the city and 
has been associating with some of Albany’s best people.  A visiting lady 
recognised him as being a Negro who formerly lived in her city, and her 
assertion was investigated and found to be correct.  Last night he was carried 
to Forester’s Station, a few miles north of here, and ordered to board an 
outgoing train. 
   Zeigler has a fair education and polished manners, and his colour was such 
that he could easily pass for a white man where he was not known. 
BAKER, supra note 21, at 152 (recounting southern treatment of African Americans in the 
reconstruction and gilded age South).  Zeigler went to extraordinary lengths to prove 
himself a white person before the community tribunal.  As the Albany Herald later 
noted, Zeigler returned with “a party composed of relatives and influential friends from 
his native state of South Carolina” to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the town that he 
was, in reality, a white man.  Id. 
 103. See Cook v. Patterson Drug Co., 39 S.E.2d 304, 307 (Va. 1946) (recognizing a 
valid claim in slander where the petitioner sought compensation for the damage to his 
reputation as a white person that occurred when he was served a pepsi-cola in a paper 
cup reserved for African-American patrons rather than a coca-cola in a glass reserved for 
white patrons). 
 104. Certain legal writers, variously labeled “realists,” recognized the ability of the 
law to create value through the sheer act of boundary tending.  See HOHFELD, LEGAL 
ESSAYS, supra note 35, at 14; Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the 
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mistaken for a black person, the southern courts simultaneously created 
a valuable property interest in white identity and embedded that interest 
within a racial hierarchy of honor.105  As Bertram Wyatt-Brown reminds 
us, “[L]ocal opinion . . . was the dominant force in Southern public 
life, . . . [and] honor alone was absolute and indivisible.”106  The Plessy 
Court’s directive, to heed “the general sentiment of the community” in 
determining honor and reputation, allowed southern courts to give legal 
form and substance to identity based on custom, prejudice, and desire; 
general sentiment provided the evidentiary weight for reputed whiteness 
to appear before the court as a property interest.107  Through the logic of 
the legal syllogism, the judicial inscription of substance to white identity 
achieved its own justification; as courts upheld an ideology of race in the 
community, this ideology ossified into legal precedent that circumscribed 
and enhanced the meaning of white subjectivity.   
The judicial construction of reputation as racially specific property 
continually stripped black subjectivity of its evidentiary weight, with 
southern courts refusing to recognize an injury to black reputation.  For 
instance, B.C. Franklin, a black attorney practicing in Tulsa, Oklahoma 
as late as 1938, objected to a local newspaper story that portrayed him as 
using illiterate grammar and referring to his clients as “pore [sic] colored 
nigger boys.”108  Citing the state libel statute in his suit against the 
newspaper’s publisher, Franklin contended that the story damaged his 
reputation in the black community, his sole base of clients, by ascribing 
to him the use of the word “nigger,” a term “detestable to the members 
 
Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 214 (1922) [hereinafter Hale, Rate Making] 
(discussing the legal construction of value in rate cases and noting that “ownership is an 
indirect method whereby the government coerces some to yield an income to owners”); 
Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court’s Ambiguous Use of “Value” in Rate Cases, 18 
COLUM. L. REV. 208, 212 (1918) (discussing the judicial determination of property 
value).  See generally JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 8, 11–46 
(1924) (discussing the legal creation of exchange value). 
 105. See Michaelson v. Turk, 90 S.E. 395, 398–401 (W. Va. 1916) (discussing the 
connection between honor, reputation, and property in one’s good name in the context of 
common-law defamation and statutory slander). 
 106. BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE 
OLD SOUTH 364 (1982) (examining the foundational importance of locality to southern 
politics and culture).  See generally EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984) (discussing honor). 
 107. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549, 551 (1896); see also Dimock, supra 
note 11, at 33, 44 (discussing rights as a form of property in the context of Plessy’s 
contingent universe). 
 108. Franklin v. World Publ’g Co., 83 P.2d 401, 402 (Okla. 1938). 
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of the Negro race”109 and one that would surely hold “him up to scorn, 
hatred, ridicule and contempt” in his community.110  In spite of the 
obvious harm, the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied any injury to 
Franklin’s reputation, noting, “In order to be libelous, [the publication] 
must tend to lower him in the opinion of men whose standard of opinion 
the court can properly recognize or tend to induce them to entertain an ill 
opinion of him.”111  In declaring the newspaper article legally benign, 
the court reasoned: 
The word “nigger” . . . has been brought forward from the days of negro slavery 
and is today frequently used by both the white man and the negro in a friendly 
way without reflection or ill feeling[,] . . . and we are unable to see how the use 
of the word as generally used when referring to the negro, casts any insult or 
reflection whatsoever.112 
Drawing upon the presumed opinions of the judicially imagined white 
community enabled the court to dissipate the specific effect of the 
language on Franklin’s reputation and to deny the legal weight of his 
reputation by inverting the elements of the law of libel.113  As one 
Virginia court acknowledged, contrary to Franklin, concerning the 
elements of a libel directed at a white man, “The gravamen of the action 
is the insult to the feelings of the offended party, not the intention of the 
party using the words. . . .  ‘The publication of a libel . . . gives a right of 
recovery, irrespective of the intent of the defendant who published 
it . . . .’”114  The judges in Franklin disregarded this orthodox view, 
indicating their unwillingness to entertain the notion of an injury to a 
reputation they would not recognize, emanating from a community they 
did not consider.  As such, they were truly “unable to see” reputation as 
either honor or property, not predicated on whiteness.115  The court, 
consequently, subsumed Franklin’s injury into the weightless legal 
category of black reputation, recalling, in paraphrase, Justice Brown’s 
 
 109. Id. at 403; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1441 (West 1980) (codifying 
state libel law). 
 110. Franklin, 83 P.2d at 403. 
 111. Id. at 404 (quoting Phoenix Printing Co. v. Robertson, 195 P. 487 (Okla. 1921)). 
 112. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).  By point of comparison, the court observed that 
“[t]he Chinaman is frequently referred to as a ‘Chink.’  The northern man is often 
referred to as ‘Yankee’ and the southern man as ‘Rebel.’  The people of Oklahoma are 
referred to as ‘Sooners.’”  Id.  Franklin’s suit appears to be the only recorded appellate 
case between 1888 and 1957 brought by a black plaintiff claiming an injury to reputation 
arising from an explicit racial defamation.  Cf.  Lee v. New Orleans Great N. R.R. Co., 51 
So. 182, 183 (La. 1910) (discussing the term “Negro” or “nigger” as a term of reproach). 
 113. Just as the courts created value in whiteness through the very gesture of 
entertaining suits of race misrecognition, the reality of white community opinion received 
its form and substance through the very act of reliance made by the court in Franklin. 
 114. Cook v. Patterson Drug Co., 39 S.E.2d 304, 307 (Va. 1946) (quoting Holmes 
v. Jones, 41 N.E. 409, 411 (N.Y. 1895)). 
 115. Franklin, 83 P.2d at 403. 
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dismissive comment in Plessy that separate coaches appear as badges of 
inferiority only because blacks had chosen that construction.116 
Through a fashioning of defamation law that validated the “peculiar 
social conditions prevailing,”117 southern courts shaped and then guarded 
the sense of community and the value, honor, and meaning of white 
subjectivity.  The majority rule in every southern state made it libelous 
per se to erroneously publish that a white person was black.118 As one 
Kentucky court commented in 1916, implicating northern states: 
 
 116. See Justice Brown’s observation in Plessy: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the 
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored 
race with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of anything 
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction upon it. 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 117. Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So. 577, 577 (Ala. 1915) (finding an actionable 
claim of libel where an asterisk next to the plaintiff’s name in the Selma City directory 
made the false representation that the plaintiff was a black city resident). 
 118. Stephenson, supra note 97, at 47–48 (discussing the southern courts’ 
disposition of defamation cases involving race).  Stephenson notes that the first judicial 
effort to determine such race misrecognition actionable per se was the 1791 South 
Carolina case of Eden v. Legare, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 171 (1791), where the court 
considered whether words identifying a white citizen as a black man disparaged the 
claimant in his trade, business, or profession and, moreover, subjected the claimant to 
civil disabilities.  While the Eden court considered the verbal opprobrium actionable per 
se, later courts considering the question did not uniformly regard such an utterance as so 
inflammatory as to require strict liability.  According to Stephenson, not until the period 
after the Civil War, and attendant upon the development of Jim Crow legislation, were 
the courts willing to enforce the per se rule without conflict.  Id. at 48.  Southern courts 
crafted per se libel standards in cases of race misrecognition not only as a means for 
underscoring the proprietary value of whiteness, but also to cleave linguistically what 
state action sought to separate physically under the guise of Jim Crow policies, both de 
jure and de facto.  As one southern court observed in 1907, the distinction between the 
races 
had its origin in the creation of the races, and is firmly established as a part of 
the social and domestic order and economy of the country, and the man or set 
of men of either race who attempts to ignore or obliterate these distinctions and 
differences undertakes an impossible task.  This racial distinction, and the 
resulting classification, is rocognized [sic] by Legislatures, authorized by 
courts, sanctioned by custom, and approved by an enlightened public opinion.  
It is not confined to any community, state or nation, but is found wherever the 
two races abound in sufficient numbers to make noticeable the impassable 
chasm that separates them.  In the home, the school, the church, the public 
place—in truth, everywhere—it exists. 
Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 101 S.W. 386, 388 (Ky. 1907) (finding no 
constitutional infirmity in allowing a common carrier to segregate passengers on the 
basis of race, so long as the accommodations were equal between the races). 
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Perhaps there are some parts of the United States in which a publication of this 
nature would not tend to disgrace or degrade the white man of whom it was 
published or render him odious and contemptible in the estimation of his friends 
and acquaintances.  But in this state we are sure there could not be two opinions 
on this subject.119 
Additionally, southern courts considered words spoken as slanderous per 
se if they transgressed the color line by calling into doubt a party’s racial 
identity.  In a 1913 case involving the accusation that Mrs. James Holt’s 
“father was a thief, and her mother a Negro, and she was a half-breed,”120 
the Arkansas Supreme Court found little difficulty in concluding that 
defendant Bill Morris uttered per se slander, opining: 
[I]t cannot be disputed that charging a white man with being a negro is 
calculated to bring into disrepute his good name or character.  No one could 
make such a charge, knowing it to be false, without understanding that its effect 
would be injurious to the character of the person so slandered.121 
The only exceptions to the judicial equivalency of libel and slander in 
cases of racial misrecognition were in the states of Kentucky and North 
Carolina, where the courts did not recognize a verbal charge as slander 
per se, but required allegation and proof of special damages to maintain 
an action.122 
 
 119. Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 183 S.W. 269, 276 (Ky. 1916) 
(finding defamation of race misrecognition in a corporate context). 
 120. Morris v. State, 160 S.W. 387, 387 (Ark. 1913). 
 121. Morris, 160 S.W. at 388 (finding that per se slander was available for the 
defendant’s comments but reversing and remanding for a new trial where the plaintiff’s 
attorney failed to charge the exact language used, setting out only his conclusions 
regarding the meaning and effect of the words). 
 122. Deese v. Collins, 133 S.E. 92, 92 (N.C. 1926) (finding that an action for 
slander requires the plaintiff to allege and prove special damages).  Deese relied upon the 
North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in McDowell v. Bowles, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 184 
(1860), determining that referring to someone as a “free negro” did not amount to slander per 
se, but required the claimant to proffer an assertion of special damages.  The Kentucky 
Supreme Court did not find slander per se in the remark to a white man that he was “a 
damn negro, and his mother was a mulatto.”  Williams v. Riddle, 140 S.W. 661, 664 (Ky. 
1911).  George Riddle’s remark had, according to Williams’s plea, affected his association 
with “a young lady, who was of one of the best families of the neighborhood[,] . . . 
permanently depriv[ing him] of the association, respect, and company of said young 
lady, and of all other young ladies of the best families in said neighborhood.”  Id.  
Relying on McDowell, the court narrowly rendered the special damages upon which 
Williams might recover, noting that the claimed injury “must be a loss of a pecuniary 
character, or the loss of some substantial or material advantage. . . . [E]vidence of the 
loss of consortium vicinorum, or evidence that plaintiff’s relatives slighted and shunned 
him, is not sufficient to show special damages.”  Id.  These courts may have been more 
willing to resist finding per se harm for comments uttered in the heat of an argument. 
More importantly, courts proved less willing to find harm predicated on exaggerated 
insults that, through their very utterance, relied upon and reinforced race hierarchy than 
if the slander represented a challenge to the judicially maintained cultural fabric of race 
separation.  See Watkins v. Augusta Chronicle Publ’g Co., 174 S.E. 199, 200 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1934) (finding evidence of libel inadequate because no special damages were pled 
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The southern judicial insistence on finding an injury per se, regardless 
of whether the error was spoken or written, extinguished the long-
standing legal distinction between libel and slander, laying bare a 
judicial activism intent on maintaining the value of white reputation.  An 
appellate court in Texas in 1912 went so far as to find a local newspaper 
libelous for reporting that an unidentified “negress” had been robbed 
while, two days later, naming the victim in an article that did not 
mention her race.123  In confirming the lower court judgment of $500 in 
damages, the appellate court asserted a broad reading of libel, finding 
that it was “sufficient if those who know the plaintiff can discern that 
she was the person meant.”124 
Not only did southern courts refashion the existing legal differences 
between libel and slander, but an equal number also regarded gesture 
and innuendo as per se injuries to white reputation.125  For instance, in 
 
and the plaintiff’s character was not called into question, where a local paper reported 
two days prior to an election that the plaintiff, a candidate for the office of sheriff, had 
received the endorsement of a “group of negroes representing 1,100 registered voters,” 
while also running an article in the next column on a “meeting to be held at the 
courthouse to build an invincible voting machine for the sustenance of white supremacy 
in this community”); Berot v. Porte, 81 So. 323, 323 (La. 1919) (discussing an instance 
in which a party may have a qualified privilege to make verbal accusations concerning 
racial identity where there is a social or moral duty, as in this case involving the 
defendant’s review of the plaintiff’s membership application to the Order of Druids); 
MacIntyre v. Fruchter, 148 N.Y.S. 786, 786–87 (Gen. Term 1914) (finding no slander 
per se where the objectionable comment, “You are only fit for niggers to associate with, 
and only worked with niggers in the South,” did not involve a claim of special damages 
showing an intent to injure the plaintiff in any trade). 
 123. Express Publ’g Co. v. Orsborn, 151 S.W. 574, 574–75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) 
(affirming the libel judgment for a plaintiff identified in a news article not by her name but 
as a “negress”). 
 124. Id. at 575.  Courts considered racial misrecognition so egregious that, between 
1888 and 1957, only two court decisions vacated a libel conviction without remanding 
the case for a new trial.  In Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So. 577, 577 (Ala. 1915), the 
publisher of the city directory for Selma, Alabama mistakenly placed an asterisk next to 
the name of one Mary Jones, consequently identifying her as a black resident of the city.  
While pointing to the fact that the publisher had quickly amended the directory in 
reasoning its dismissal, the Alabama Supreme Court found it significant that Jones had 
failed to join the printing company, the party presumably responsible for the error, in the 
suit.  See also Little Rock Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Putsche, 104 S.W. 554 (Ark. 1907) 
(reversing the trial court’s award of damages for mental anguish to Ida Putsche in her 
suit against a street car company whose conductor referred to her as a “negress” and 
demanded that she sit in the back of the car, an entreaty which she ignored without 
further incident). 
 125. A finding of per se defamatory harm in gesture and innuendo was the exception 
to the rule that required claimants to establish special damages through a showing of 
pecuniary injury.  See NEWELL, supra note 12, at 54 (describing the treatment of legal 
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1910 the Supreme Court of Louisiana found the conductor of a 
Shreveport streetcar liable in defamation for gesturing the elderly and 
deaf Mrs. Emma May toward the back of the car.126  Awarding Mrs. 
May $250, the court reasoned: 
The question, “Don’t you belong over there?” when the person asking it points 
to seats in a car set apart for negroes and designated by a sign, is sufficient to 
wound the feelings of the white person to whom it is addressed, and, for that 
wound, the defendant is bound to render an account.127 
In another instance, a Texas court in 1941 found mere innuendo 
sufficient for a defamation claim in which an elevator operator requested 
that May O’Connor leave the lift and use an elevator at the rear of the 
Dallas cotton exchange.128  At the time of the incident, the plaintiff 
claimed she was “ignorant of the fact” that the elevator existed only for 
use by black passengers and freight.129  Nevertheless, in reversing the 
lower court’s decision to deny O’Connor’s claim, Justice Looney agreed 
that the innuendo did “designate and classify her as a Negro, . . . 
shaming and disgracing her before . . . white persons . . . and causing her 
to be branded and considered as a negro by the negroes in the elevator 
she was directed to use.”130  The legal weight afforded such innuendo 
testifies to the uncertainty and volatility of the color line.131  That, in the 
 
criteria involving unspoken defamation). 
 126. May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 53 So. 671, 675 (La. 1910) (finding a railway 
company liable for race misrecognition in accommodating passengers). 
 127. Id. 
 128. O’Connor v. Dallas Cotton Exch., 153 S.W.2d 266, 267–68 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1941) (reversing and remanding the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim of race 
misrecognition concerning an elevator ride). 
 129. Id. at 267. 
 130. Id.  Interestingly, in this case the court treated the opinions of black patrons 
riding the freight elevator with Mrs. O’Connor as possessing significant legal weight.  
Rather than signifying a shift in evidentiary standards, this recognition reflected and 
reinforced a condition in which courts refused to recognize any property interest in the 
reputation of black identity, a condition enunciated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 
Franklin v. World Publishing Co., 83 P.2d 401 (Okla. 1938). O’Connor’s 
accommodation indicated that the courts might recognize the materiality of a black 
witness’s opinion only when that testimony reinforced the absence of a property interest 
in  black reputation, as here, by enunciating the embarrassment and shame that May 
O’Connor experienced at being misrecognized.  In these instances, the courts provided 
legal voice and weight to the testimony of black witnesses only for self-indictment.  See 
also Bagwell v. Rice & Hutchins Atlanta Co., 143 S.E. 125, 126 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928) 
(finding that the statute of limitations barred the petitioner’s claim for “slandering [her] 
good name” when she was instructed by a salesperson to “get over with the negroes where 
you belong” while waiting to try on shoes in the defendant’s shoe store). 
 131. Indeed, the volatility of whiteness imparted such legal weight to everyday 
conversation that it extended its reach even to racial comments made by a child’s 
playmate.  See Mopsikov v. Cook, 95 S.E. 426, 427 (Va. 1918) (extinguishing the trial 
court’s award of $2000 and remanding for a new trial to show that the nine-year-old 
daughter’s comment to Jacob Mopsikov’s daughter that she was a “nigger doll” 
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eyes of the court, racial identity might be so established in one elevator 
ride as to “brand” the passenger indicates the indelible protocol of a 
system of formal and informal Jim Crow rules in which color mattered 
less than context and reputation determined racial subjectivity.132 
Holding a person accountable not only for a published error, but 
equally for utterance, innuendo, and gesture that impugned another’s 
white reputation enabled the courts to mark the boundaries of race 
and subjectivity.133  The southern judiciary actively reinscribed, in the 
terms of the Plessy Court, the “general sentiment of the [white] 
community”—its practice of racial hierarchy and domination—when 
they narrated in legal opinions their reasoning for presuming harm in a 
case of racial misrecognition.134  Within these opinions that re-created 
racial distinctions by valorizing white reputation lay legal homilies to 
the natural detachment of the judiciary from interference with the social 
status of the races.135  The courts covered their own constructed tracks 
 
originated with the child’s father, defendant Benjamin Cook). 
 132. As the question of whether falsely charging “a white person with being a 
negro” amounted to slander came before the court as a case of first impression, 
O’Connor relied upon Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71 (La. 1888), for the cultural and 
legal proposition that “in view of the social habits, customs, traditions and prejudices 
prevalent in this state, in regard to the status of whites and blacks, we think such a charge 
would be slanderous.”  O’Connor, 153 S.W.2d at 268.  The quandary for the court lay in 
establishing a legal claim from pure innuendo.  As the court observed: 
[I]t was not alleged that, the operator of the elevator called plaintiff’s wife a 
negro, or classified her as such; the allegation being that the operator simply 
directed plaintiff’s wife to leave the elevator first entered and use another at 
the rear of the building, the reason for the change was not stated, nor did 
plaintiff’s wife, at the time, know the reason, which was made to appear by an 
innuendo, explanatory of the conduct of the operator, but not explanatory of 
the language used, which was unambiguous and without any implication that 
plaintiff’s wife was a negro. 
Id. at 268.  The court resolved its uncertainty by concluding that O’Connor was an 
invitee to whom the Dallas Cotton Exchange owed a “high degree of care,” and the 
elevator conductor’s innuendo had breached that duty.  Id. 
 133. See TOWNSHEND, supra note 57, at § 338, at 572. 
Where language is ambiguous and is as susceptible of a harmless as of an 
injurious meaning, it is the function of an innuendo to point out the meaning 
which the plaintiff claims to be the true meaning, and the meaning upon which 
he relies to sustain his action.  This applies whether the ambiguity be patent or 
latent, and whether or not there are any facts alleged as inducement. 
Id. (internal reference and footnotes omitted); see also NEWELL, supra note 12, at 754 
(addressing the legal criteria for defamation). 
 134. See Dimock, supra note 11, at 43 (proposing that the Court’s opinion in Plessy 
deployed the evidentiary weight of subjective community feelings in such a way as to 
enable later courts to valorize the sentiments of white subjectivity). 
 135. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 3–13 (arguing that the prevailing legal 
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through the contention they were merely observing the social landscape.  
As one Georgia court observed in handing down a slander decision in 
1907, “Under our benign institutions ‘every man is the architect of his 
own fortune.’  Every citizen, white and black, may gain, in every field of 
endeavor, the recognition his associates may award. . . .  But the courts 
can take notice of the architecture without intermeddling with the 
building of the structure.”136  The courts refused to recognize that, in 
taking judicial “notice of the architecture,” they were conserving as 
well as entitling the structure.  Indeed, merely acknowledging a per se 
right of recovery imputed intrinsic value to whiteness predicated on 
difference.137  By invoking custom, sentiment, habit, tradition, and 
prejudice as judicial rationale for finding harm, valorizing white honor, 
and emptying the legal content of black identity, courts strove to create 
and affirm stark racial distinctions in reputation and subjectivity. 
Courts viewed these defamatory charges of race misrecognition as 
serious harms, for they implied transgression of racial boundaries, 
jeopardizing the constructed differences in subjectivity and race that 
generated the very meaning of white reputation.  As one Louisiana court 
remarked in 1888, “under the social habits, custom, and prejudices 
prevailing . . . it cannot be disputed that charging a white man with being 
a negro is calculated to inflict injury and damage.  We are concerned 
with these social conditions simply as facts.  They exist and, for that 
reason, we deal with them.”138  The male claimant in this early case of 
 
orthodoxy during this period emphasized a rational ordering of the law that separated the 
public from the private and consigned the regulation of society to an elected rather than 
an appointed governmental body). 
 136. Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 58 S.E. 899, 901 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907) (finding a 
right of recovery in slander for the petitioner and his sister when the city rail car 
conductor placed them in the rear of the car).  Consonant with the cultural and political 
inclination of the period, interference in the judicially conceived separate spheres of 
social and economic endeavor exceeded constitutional mandate and judicial competence.  
For Judge Russell, the author of the Wolfe opinion, courts could do no more than take 
judicial notice of the “habits of the people” in observing the social and political 
inequality between the white and black citizens of the state.  Id.  Russell naturalized this 
inequality, placing it prior to the formation of the republican form of government and 
therefore beyond the legitimate grasp of the judiciary, observing: 
It is a matter of common knowledge that, viewed from a social standpoint, the 
negro race is in mind and morals inferior to the Caucasian.  The record of each 
from the dawn of historic time denies equality. . . . The distinction and 
inequality is recognized in Holy Writ. . . . We take judicial notice of an 
intrinsic difference between the two races. . . . Notice of this difference does 
not imply legal discrimination against either, and for that reason cannot, in any 
sense, impugn or oppose the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of our own state. 
Id. 
 137. Id. at 902; see Hale, Rate Making, supra note 104, at 213 (examining the 
creation of value through judicial decisionmaking). 
 138. Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71, 72 (La. 1888) (emphasis added) (upholding a 
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racial slander could claim an injury to honor and property because the 
court instilled value in his reputation as a white man through legal 
recognition.139  The prevailing judicial ideology enabled courts to rely on 
the “general sentiment of the community” as a “fact” that they might 
place in evidence for the proposition that racial misrecognition resulted 
in a harm from which a claimant might recover.140  Yet reputational 
value in whiteness arose through legal approbation.  The judicial act of 
imagining both “community” and “sentiment” validated and ossified as 
legal fiat the mutable cultural impulses that yearned for racial separation 
and hierarchy.141 
By reading social habits as facts, courts cloaked their acts of creation 
as merely another exercise in taking judicial notice.142  Nevertheless, 
courts engaged in a myriad of discursive maneuvers to locate the value 
of whiteness as property externally and prior to the advent of their own 
legal rulings.  Namely, courts located differences in racial identity 
 
finding of per se slander for the false assertion that the plaintiff was black and 
confirming the judgment for $500 in damages); see also Flood v. News & Courier Co., 
50 S.E. 637, 639 (S.C. 1905).  The court found libel per se in identifying a white man as 
a black man in print, observing that 
it must be apparent that to impute the condition of the negro to a white man 
would affect his (the white man’s) social status, and, in case any one publish a 
white man to be a negro, it would not only be galling to his pride, but would 
tend to interfere seriously with the social relation of the white man with his 
fellow white men; and, to protect the white man from such a publication, it is 
necessary to bring such a charge to an issue quickly. 
Id. 
 139. Spotorno, 4 So. at 71. 
 140. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 141. See LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOMENT IN 
AMERICA xii-xiv (1976) (discussing the ideology of the coherent self as foundational to 
populism); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 3–12 (3d rev. ed. 
1974) (tracing the malleable social and political culture of the reconstruction South prior 
to the rise of Jim Crow policies that quickened segregationist impulses).  Indeed, as 
Peggy Pascoe observes, prior to the hardening of state miscegenation laws, judges 
elected to uphold these particular marriages in the 1870s.  Pascoe, supra note 55, at 220; 
see also Lee v. New Orleans Great N. R.R. Co., 51 So. 182, 184 (La. 1910) (concluding 
that, while the parties were married legally in 1889, prior to the passage of state 
miscegenation laws, their children did not belong to the “white race”).  See generally 
Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872); Hart v. Hoss, 26 La. Ann. 90 (1874); Ex parte 
Brown, 5 CENT. L.J. 149 (Tex. 1877) (describing the unreported U.S. District Court of 
Texas case of Ex parte Brown); State v. Webb, 4 CENT. L.J. 588 (1877) (describing the 
unreported District Court of the First Judicial District of Texas case of State v. Webb); 
Honey v. Clark, 37 Tex. 686 (1873). 
 142. Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 58 S.E. 899, 901 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907); Spotorno, 
4 So. at 71. 
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inherent in nature, divine pattern, Holy Writ, and social and cultural 
practice.143  By recognizing and reinscribing—indeed, in the most profound 
sense, by naming—the sentiment and location of the white community 
as social fact with evidentiary weight, courts substantiated miscegenation 
laws, Jim Crow coaches, school segregation, and racially restrictive 
covenants in mortgages, not to mention everyday patterns of enforced 
segregation and deference.144  In turning to these decisions for precedent 
of the value of a white reputation, courts also fashioned the legal 
parameters that valorized community sentiment and substantiated a legal 
discourse that defined subjectivity at the law as predicated on racial 
reputation. 
The courts reserved their most pointed responses for defamatory 
remarks of racial misrecognition that also transgressed gender 
boundaries.  Southern community sentiment invested the figure of the 
white woman with a purity and piety resonating with Victorian era 
values.145  Southern judges framed this sentiment when they delivered 
fiery opinions and large fines to hapless defendants who had erroneously 
paired white women and black men.  In one such instance, the Axton 
Fisher Tobacco Company brought a libel suit against the Louisville 
Evening Post for a story it ran on the company in 1913, in which the 
newspaper mentioned that “a negro foreman was placed as boss over 
white girls.”146  The court turned to a litany of cases involving segregation 
 
 143. Wolfe, 58 S.E. at 901; Spotorno, 4 So. at 72. 
 144. With regard to racially restrictive covenants as a valuable property right 
creating an easement in favor of the owner of one parcel of land with the restricted 
district which cannot be taken under the power of eminent domain without just 
compensation, see generally Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. 1947), rev’d sub 
nom. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (accepting the plaintiff’s observations as to 
the defendant’s racial makeup despite testimony on the difficulty of assigning racial 
identity and finding a property interest in racially restrictive easements); Porter v. 
Johnson, 115 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (treating a racially restrictive covenant as 
a property right enforceable against black homeowners in a residential subdivision). 
 145. WILLIAMSON, supra note 21, at 196 (discussing the anxiety among southern 
white men over the perceived vulnerability of white women to black men); see also 
Thomas Nelson Page, The Lynching of Negroes—Its Cause and Its Prevention, 178 N. 
AM. REV. 33, 39 (1904) (discussing the cause of lynching in the American South as an 
effort by white men “to put an end to the ravishing of their women”). 
 146. Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 183 S.W. 268, 276 (Ky. 1916).  
In several editions of the Louisville Evening Post, the paper discussed the working 
conditions at the Axton factory, manufacturers of smoking and twist tobacco under the 
labels “Old Hill Side” and “Booster Twist.”  In the October 4, 1913 edition of the paper, 
the story read in part: 
   In [Axton’s] factory he puts negro foremen over white men.  It is another 
example of his double dealing with laboring men.  He don’t dare deny it. 
   A negro named Brown was foreman on the third and fourth floors of Axton’s 
factory and that he had many white men under him.  This is the same Wm. H. 
Brown, colored, whose name appears in the city directory, page 230, as 
foreman of the Axton Tobacco Factory. 
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in common carriers, schools, and residences as evidence of the race 
“difference[s] recognized by all” based on inheritance, tradition, 
training, education, and custom.”147  However, in finding the Post article 
libelous per se,148 the court emphasized that the “sentiment reflected” in 
race legislation and supporting judicial opinion “does not find the ends 
or the perfection of its purpose in mere race separation alone[,] . . . [but] 
in the general feeling everywhere prevailing that the negro . . . is not and 
cannot be a fit associate for white girls.”149  In this instance, race 
misrecognition of an individual was not the issue, but rather the 
imputation of racial and sexual commingling, with its implication of 
 
Id. at 271.  In the October 18, 1913 edition of the paper, the story read: 
   Negro foreman was placed as boss over white girls in Axton factory.  The 
negro foreman Will Brown was then placed in charge of machines where the 
girls were employed and as a boss over them.  The girls then quit work and 
refused to work under a negro foreman.  They reported the whole trouble to 
Local Union No. 16. . . .  
. . . . 
   Mr. Hardy and the Grievance Committee investigated and found that the 
charges of the girls against Mr. Axton’s factory were true and so reported back 
to the union.  Axton would not remedy the matter, and upon Mr. Hardy’s 
recommendation the union, after a number of fruitless conferences with Mr. 
Axton, withdrew the use of the union label from the Axton factory and placed 
him and his factory upon the unfair list.  This action was ratified by the 
International Union of Tobacco Workers. 
Id. at 272 (alterations provided by court omitted).  While the newspaper story concerned 
transgressing racial and class hierarchies, the court and the union took special care to act 
on the issue when they paired a black man with white women, threatening quickened 
cultural norms that feared black men in authority as a threat to the purity of white women 
and as a challenge to the virility of white men.  For a contemporary account, see Page, 
supra note 145, at 45, wherein Page discusses the need to end lynching while also noting 
that social equality to “the young negro . . . signifies but one thing: the opportunity to 
enjoy, equally with white men, the privilege of cohabiting with white women.  This the 
whites of the South understand . . .”  Id. 
 147. Axton Fisher Tobacco Co., 183 S.W. at 276. 
 148. The Kentucky Supreme Court contended that, as a business entity, Axton 
could argue libel per se, “as a corporation, like an individual, may have a good reputation 
and enjoy the good will of its customers and the public, and this good reputation and 
good will are as valuable to it as good will would be to an individual or partnership.”  Id. 
at 274.  Indeed, the court rendered broadly the scope of harm for which a corporation 
might seek compensation.  The lower court found that Axton had not suffered harm from 
the publication because the printed remarks did not constitute a libel per se of its 
products, business methods, or creditworthiness.  On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court found that a publication which commented only upon a corporation’s cultural 
practices might inflict harm “if the publication reasonably and naturally has the effect of 
bringing the business of the corporation into public contempt, and of making it odious in 
the estimation of those with whom it has business dealings or connections.”  Id. at 275. 
 149. Id. at 276–77. 
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taint, of thwarting segregation, and with its innuendo of sexual desire 
leading to a blurring of the color line.150 
One of the principles in Plessy, highlighted in Tourgee’s brief, 
established that the seemingly manifest criteria for separate facilities—
distinctions based upon color—proved difficult to discern.151  Indeed, as 
one Kentucky judge admitted, when Louella Thurman brought a suit for 
slander against the local railway for being told by the conductor to sit in 
a Jim Crow car: “What race a person belongs to cannot always be 
determined infallibly from appearances . . . .”152  Likewise, in a slander 
suit originating in Danville, Virginia, a soda fountain clerk at the local 
drug store served Harvey Cook a pepsi-cola in a paper cup rather than 
the requested coca-cola in a glass.153  When Cook objected, he was told, 
“We don’t serve negroes coca-colas, and we don’t let them drink out of 
glasses.”154  According to the court, “Cook reached up and pulled his 
hair, and asked if it looked like a negro’s hair.  The [clerk] said ‘Yes.  I 
have seen whiter negroes than you are,’ and picked up a milk bottle, and 
asked Cook what he was going to do about it.”155 
Consonant with this uncertainty over the racial interpretation of 
appearance, putatively white plaintiffs had to present evidence of their 
own white lineage.  For instance, George Spencer brought one such case 
 
 150. In Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1908), the U.S. Supreme Court 
found that women should have to work no more than ten hours in any one day because 
standing for too long would impair the “influence of vigorous health upon the future 
well-being of the race,” noting that the “the performance of maternal functions is . . . an 
object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.”  
That white women remained pure and healthy for the good of the race and the nation was 
not an issue reserved for the southern states alone, as it was a central theme of the 
judiciary concerned with progressive labor legislation, and through such concern the 
courts consequently aligned the interests of race, nation, and masculinity.  For 
information regarding innuendo, see NEWELL, supra note 12, at 754. 
 151. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548–52 (1896); Brief for the Plaintiff at 
8–14, Plessy (No. 210). 
 152. S. Ry. Co. v. Thurman, 90 S.W. 240, 241 (Ky. 1906).  The conductor’s 
insistence that Thurman leave the ladies’ coach and sit in the colored coach precipitated 
this suit for libel.  At trial, Thurman recovered a judgment for $4000, which, in a rare 
instance, the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial in light of its 
conclusion that the jury had not been instructed that if a carrier exercises ordinary care 
and is not “insulting” to the passenger, it is not liable for damages.  Id.  Thurman could 
still recover on the evidence that the brakeman had insulted her when he remarked that 
he recognized her as “a whore off of Dewees street,” bearing witness to the cultural 
slippage between an accusation of racial transgression and an accounting of criminal 
activity.  Id. at 240. 
 153. Cook v. Patterson Drug Co., 39 S.E.2d 304, 306 (Va. 1946). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  Compare Weaver v. State, 116 So. 893, 895 (Ala. Ct. App. 1928) (approving as 
sufficient for purposes of racial identification testimony that the defendant’s grandfather 
had “kinky hair,” noting, “This is one of the determining characteristics of the negro”), 
with BAKER, supra note 21, at 152 (narrating the expulsion of a man from a Georgia 
town because of the community’s impression that he was black). 
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against his Virginia neighbor, George Looney, in 1914 after Looney had 
spread the word that the Spencer family sought to pass as members of 
the white race.156  In the fallout from Looney’s accusation, the local 
school board expelled the oldest son, Melvin Spencer, from the white 
grade school.157  In the course of his defamation suit, Spencer traced his 
family history, provided a “number of reputable citizens” as witnesses 
acquainted with his father and grandfather to testify to their “standing 
and reputation as white men,”158 and supplied photographs of his 
grandfather and aunt for the purpose of showing they were white.159  Of 
 
 156. Spencer v. Looney, 82 S.E. 745, 746 (Va. 1914).  Of the Spencer family, 
Looney commented that “[t]hey are nothing but God damned negroes, and I can prove 
that they are God damned negroes.”  Id. (alterations provided by court omitted).  This 
suit involved both slander and libel, as Looney pursued affidavits purportedly from 
people in Kentucky to support his accusations and to force the white public school to bar 
George Spencer’s son from attending.  Interestingly, and in light of this discussion 
concerning the volatility of racial subjectivity, the court makes special mention of the 
peculiar history between these two men: 
[P]laintiff in error and his father having in recent years worked for defendant 
in error and stayed at his home, where they were treated as white people, 
eating at his table and sleeping in his beds.  About two years prior to the 
trouble out of which this suit arises Jack Spencer, a brother of plaintiff in error, 
was accused of killing one Henderson Looney, a brother of defendant in error, 
and after that time, as it appears, the latter began to raise objections to plaintiff 
in error’s boy, Melvin, attending the white public free schools of Buchanan 
county . . . . 
Id.  Indicative of the combustibility of the assignment of racial subjectivity, it appears, as 
in Looney, that accusations regarding passing might serve as a ready tool for exacting 
revenge.  See also Stultz v. Cousins, 242 F. 794, 797 (6th Cir. 1917) (finding that 
deliberate race misrecognition was used for labor advantage in employment); Watkins v. 
Augusta Chronicle Publ’g Co., 174 S.E. 199, 200–01 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934) (finding no 
deliberate effort to sabotage the plaintiff’s candidacy and no cause for libel because no 
special damages were pled and the plaintiff’s character was not called into question, where 
the local paper reported two days prior to the election that the plaintiff, a candidate for 
the office of sheriff, had received the endorsement of a “group of negroes representing 
1,100 registered voters” while also running an article in the next column on a “meeting 
to be held at the courthouse to build an invincible voting machine for the sustenance of 
white supremacy in this community”); Jones v. Gill, 66 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Kan. 1937) 
(finding hearsay evidence inadequate to establish slander in the plaintiff’s claim that her 
stepmother-in-law had started rumors that the plaintiff’s adopted daughter had “Negro 
blood”); Berot v. Porte, 81 So. 323, 324 (La. 1919) (finding that the defendant had not 
attempted to scuttle the plaintiff’s membership in the Order of Druids by commenting 
that “there was a streak in the family, and that a full investigation should be made” 
regarding the plaintiff’s racial identity). 
 157. Spencer, 82 S.E. at 746. 
 158. Id. at 748. 
 159. Id. at 749.  The trial court would not permit the photographs to be shown to the 
jury, as the court was of the opinion that “they were taken from other photographs.”  Id. 
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the witnesses, the court noted: “[W]ith one exception all agree that the 
Spencers were regarded as white people, and that the senior Spencer and 
his family attended the white schools and churches.”160  For his defense 
Looney brought in “experts” to testify to some quantum of “Negro 
blood” due to the family’s facial features.161  Finding merit in Spencer’s 
claim, the appellate court vacated the lower court’s determination that 
Looney’s accusations were not libelous because true and remanded the 
case for a new trial.162 
The concern courts displayed over the invisibility of race—that there 
might be someone in the community not quite white163—lessened if, in 
the course of the trial, they sensed that the party accusing another of 
racial transgression harbored malice or sought ill-gain.  In 1913, for 
instance, the members of a firemen’s brotherhood in Erwin, Tennessee 
wrote to the master mechanic that one of the brotherhood’s chosen, Isaac 
Cousins, was not a “full-blooded white.”164  This complaint resulted in 
Cousins’s dismissal from the brotherhood, with the remaining members, 
those leveling the charge, moving up to fill his position.165  Cousins 
subsequently brought a libel suit against the thirty-six members of the 
brotherhood based on the offending letter sent on behalf of the 
brotherhood to the master mechanic of the railway.166  Sensing avarice 
on the part of the defendants, the trial court allowed, and the appellate 
court upheld, the submission into evidence by Cousins of a “crayon 
portrait of [his] great-uncle and his white wife, made before the 
controversy arose and testified to by [Cousins], who knew him, to be a 
true picture of the uncle.”167  In affirming the jury award of $3400, the 
appellate court reasoned, “That it was a crayon representation, and not a 
photograph, went only to its weight, not to its admissibility, as tending to 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 748.  The appellate court found Looney’s witnesses less than credible, 
noting that they revealed no special competence in determining whether George 
Spencer’s son Melvin’s “lips, nose [and] yellow skin” indicated more than one-sixteenth 
“negro blood.”  Id. at 750. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Jones v. Gill, 66 P.2d 1033, 1034–35 (Kan. 1937) (reversing the damage 
award for the plaintiff and remanding for a new trial a suit involving a mother’s claim 
that rumors of the racial composition of her adopted daughter—that she had “Negro 
blood” which forced the plaintiff to move her family to several different neighborhoods 
to escape the accusations—were started by the plaintiff’s stepmother-in-law); Berot v. 
Porte, 81 So. 323, 323 (La. 1919) (affirming a party’s qualified privilege to make 
accusations concerning racial identity where there is a social or moral duty, as in this 
case involving the defendant’s confidential review of the plaintiff’s membership 
application to the Order of Druids). 
 164. Stultz v. Cousins, 242 F. 794, 796 (6th Cir. 1917). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 797. 
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show that the great-uncle was a white man.”168  Race confirmation 
turned on a constellation of ingredients and, while it does not appear 
from the record of the appellate court whether Cousins presented 
witnesses ready to vouch for his character as a white man, the jury’s 
acceptance of a crayon portrait as evidence of the plaintiff’s whiteness in 
assessing injury without a showing of special damages attests to a 
judicial willingness to expand the elements of proof available for 
countering the action of a seemingly avaricious defendant. 
Where Homer Plessy’s problematic slippage between white color and 
black race raised concerns over the means by which to ascertain 
distinctions seemingly invisible to the senses, courts in defamation 
hearings addressed this disquiet by translating the language of 
“character” into the legal grammar of race.169  Because skin color alone 
might prove insufficient verification of a plaintiff’s whiteness, courts 
looked to character as a way of reading race.170  Whiteness as a property 
claim that might be damaged by libel rested on the individual’s 
comportment with, and in, the community.  As such, whiteness was a 
legal claim proffered to validate a social condition, marked by family, 
friends, neighbors, and acquaintances, the church and school attended, 
place of residence, how time was passed, and, most certainly, with 
whom.  As the Supreme Court of South Carolina noted, reputation was a 
social and not a political claim and, while “[t]he colored race, in our 
courts of justice, stand on the same plane as the white race. . . . Our 
social conditions, however, are very different. . . . These relations and 
associations the law does not undertake to make or regulate for us.”171  
Thus, presumably courts drew meaning to inform and shape the legal 
standards of race relations from the seemingly prelegal sphere of the 
community, by reference to the genuinely authentic indication of blood 
quantum.  In actuality, the representative rhetoric of the court in Flood 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. By imputing relational rather than biological reasons in determining race, 
courts proved themselves consonant with the contemporaneous efforts by American 
pragmatists to establish identity and consciousness as both thought and thing, mind and 
body, action and entity.  Judicial attempts to consider both association and blood 
quantum as referents for racial identity suggest a nascent effort to bridge the “Cartesian 
divide” between action and entity.  Of course, this represented a nascent promise 
unfulfilled, as courts frequently regarded even the slightest evidence of a claimant’s 
association with members of the black community as indicating biology alone. 
 170. See SUSMAN, supra note 20, at 276–80 (discussing character and personality in 
the culture of the early twentieth century). 
 171. Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637, 639 (S.C. 1905). 
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served to cloak the discursive mechanisms by which the law suffused 
those very relations with meaning.  The judicial rhetoric of “social 
conditions” unsullied by legal restraint belied the very form and 
substance that comprised social relations of domination in the South: 
law, custom, and violence regulated the membership of these 
communities.  By validating whether or not the members “belonged”—and 
thus, whether a statement was false—courts increasingly relied on 
character, comportment, and, above all, association.172  For instance, in 
deciding a defamation suit involving separate accommodations on a 
streetcar, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that a conductor would not 
run afoul of the law in directing a person to the Jim Crow section if the 
person looked black or “consorted” with blacks.173  In that case the 
conductor pointed Mrs. Emma May to the back of the car because “he 
had seen, or thought he had seen, [her], on a previous occasion, riding in 
the negro end of the car.”174  One Louisiana clergyman’s “marked moral 
character, great prestige[,] . . . austere probity[,] . . . [and] well-known 
lineage” enabled him to secure damages against the local Times-
Democrat newspaper in 1901 for mistakenly referring to him in print as 
a “negro,” which, according to the court, “was enough to arouse the 
most profound indignation of the most patient man.”175  In another 
 
 172. Of course, a few courts would not maintain damage awards for reputational 
injury without some evidence of physical harm.  See Little Rock Ry. & Elec. Co. v. 
Putsche, 104 S.W. 554, 554 (Ark. 1907) (reversing the trial court’s award of damages for 
mental anguish to Ida Putsche in her suit against a street car company whose conductor 
referred to her as a “negress” and demanded that she sit in the back of the car, an 
entreaty which she ignored without further incident).  The Putsche opinion relied upon 
the clear legal demarcation between damages for mental and physical injury enunciated 
in St. Louis, I.M. & S. Railway Co. v. Taylor, 104 S.W. 551 (Ark. 1907), where the court 
concluded: 
We prefer to adhere to the rule, as a sound one, that mental suffering alone, 
unaccompanied with physical injury or any other element of recoverable 
damages, cannot be made the subject of an independent action for damages, 
even where the act or violation of duty complained of was willfully committed; 
and that such suffering does not of itself constitute a cause of action, but is 
merely “an aggravation of damages when it naturally ensues from the act 
complained of.” 
Id. at 553.  The court’s unwillingness in the instant case to find reputational harm where 
the conductor failed to effectively remove from Ida Putsche her sense of entitlement and 
belonging to her presumed racial community further suggests that the cases in which 
courts awarded damages reflected the judicial conviction that claimants had lost control 
over the ownership of their racial identity—that the sense of belonging was fragile and 
volatile. 
 173. May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 53 So. 671, 673 (La. 1910). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Upton v. Times-Democrat Publ’g Co., 28 So. 970, 971, 972 (La. 1900) 
(finding libel per se in a newspaper story published on the temperance activities of 
Revered Thomas J. Upton, in which the telegraphically dispatched story containing the 
phrase “cultured gentleman” was printed as “colored gentleman”). 
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instance, the Supreme Court of Mississippi confirmed an award of 
$5000 to a white woman, mistakenly referred to in the local paper as a 
“Negro,” after the court noted that the plaintiff was “a young married 
woman” with two small boys and a “woman of good repute in her home 
county.”176 
Similarly, the reputed whiteness of Nathan Wolfe and his sister came 
under scrutiny when a streetcar conductor placed them in the rear of the 
car reserved for black passengers.177  When Wolfe pressed the conductor 
for an explanation, the following colloquy took place: 
The conductor replied: “Because white people seat from the front, and negroes 
from the rear, of the car.”  
Petitioner asked: “What has that to do with me?”  And the conductor responded: 
“Haven’t I seen you in colored company?”   
Petitioner’s sister then addressed the conductor as follows: “Do we look like 
colored people?”178 
The court found the conductor’s intimation that the plaintiff “was a white 
man degraded . . . by having associated with negroes,” as tantamount to 
defamation of character.179  As courts translated the seeming ontology of 
race into the epistemology of character and association, race identification 
seemed tenuous and white reputation proved increasingly volatile.180 
Consequently, most defamation opinions betrayed a yearning for a 
visible difference with which to fix race.  The indelibleness of such a 
mark usually emerged in proportion to the degree of judicial insistence 
in mapping an unbridgeable social chasm between black and white 
communities.  For instance, in 1907, one Georgia judge relied with 
confidence on the palpability of “race purity” to sustain racial 
boundaries when “difference[s] in color” failed to ensure separation: 
 
 176. Natchez Times Publ’g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681, 683, 685 (Miss. 1954) 
(finding libel per se in a newspaper’s account of an automobile collision in which the 
plaintiff was driving and was described as a “Negro woman traveling in the company of 
two Negro men” and further upholding the damage recovery). 
 177. Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 58 S.E. 899, 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 903. 
 180. Indeed, in his efforts to substantiate the Wolfe decision, Judge Russell tried to 
return to the ontology of race by engaging in a lengthy disquisition on the “intrinsic 
difference” between the races, avoiding any acknowledgment that the case before him 
was predicated on the very absence of such ontological certainty, resting instead on the 
cultural subjectivity of race by association.  Id. at 901–02. 
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The amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, but it is also productive of 
deplorable results.  Our daily observation shows us that the offspring of these 
unnatural connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that they are 
inferior in physical development and strength to the full blood of either race.181 
Courts sought a language by which to mimetically translate presumed 
ontological differences of race—differences that emerged as social, 
political, and cultural inequality—onto a visual palette from which 
judges might then draw in locating racial identity without resorting to 
relational evidence that would undermine the very ontology they sought 
to unveil and reinforce.  To this end, judges relied on skin color, 
characteristics of hair, facial features, and, as did Judge Russell in Wolfe, 
the health and virility of the person in question.182 
For Judge Russell, as for others, to “call a white man a negro” did not 
simply damage the white citizen’s reputation and property in the self, it 
raised the stigma of sexual transgression.183  These courts viewed racial 
misrecognition as “imput[ing] the odium of illegitimacy”184 implicating 
the person as neither black nor white but suggesting the result of an 
illicit union that transgressed the very racial boundaries the courts 
sought to maintain.  In reality, courts assumed this posture, entertaining 
defamation actions for racial misrecognition precisely because “daily 
observation” could not suffice in maintaining segregation.185  Each 
decision upholding the value of white reputation tacitly admitted the 
existence of uncertainty, interpretation, and cultural confusion.186  
Furthermore, each case was as much an implicit acknowledgment of the 
possibility of racial transgression as it was a reassertion and re-creation 
of racial difference in reputation, subjectivity, and property in the self. 
Southern courts, however, did not always recognize a white person’s 
claim of injury to reputation, and the circumstances surrounding these 
few denials provide a measure of the threshold below which courts 
imagined a reputation for whiteness exhibited little legal merit.  In one 
such case the plaintiff, Joseph Collins, sought to recover damages to his 
reputation when the Oklahoma State Sanitarium placed his daughter, 
committed for reason of insanity, in a ward “set apart for negro patients, 
and entered upon its record opposite her name the word ‘colored,’ and 
thereby held her out to the world as a woman having negro blood.”187  
 
 181. Id. at 902–03 (quoting Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869)) (alterations in 
original). 
 182. Id. at 903. 
 183. Id. at 901. 
 184. Id. at 902. 
 185. Id. at 902–03. 
 186. See Pascoe, supra note 55, at 220. 
 187. Collins v. Okla. State Hosp., 184 P. 946, 946 (Okla. 1916). 
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied Collins’s claim by relying on a 
narrow reading of libel and refusing to consider the hospital records as a 
publication.188  In another Oklahoma libel case, the wife of a convicted 
rum-runner sought action against the local paper in 1928 for referring to 
her husband as a “negro” in a story about his release from prison.189  The 
court strictly construed the state libel statute to conclude that, as the 
article failed to mention the wife by name, it did not reflect on her and 
she had sustained no injury to her reputation.190  In a similar case 
decided by the Georgia Court of Appeals in 1934, the parents of Thomas 
Farmer sued the Atlanta Journal for defamation when the paper reported 
the death of their son as the “death of a negro convict.”191  Farmer had 
died from sunstroke while engaged in a prison labor project on a local 
public road.192  The court again construed libel narrowly to find that, 
because the newspaper had mentioned the names of neither parent, the 
publication did not intend, and readers could not reasonably presume, 
that Thomas Farmer was “in any way related to the plaintiffs.”193 
Southern courts treated defamatory injury claimed from racial 
misrecognition quite capaciously and, as one commentator observed, 
“So far as written defamation is concerned, the right to reputation, like 
the right to personal security, may be said to be an absolute right, to be 
respected at peril.”194  In this light, the truncated manner in which judges 
dismissed libel cases brought by, or about, committed or incarcerated 
persons suggests that the legal construction of reputation in whiteness 
had several pressure points from within an imagined white community.  
Thus, whites who had fallen from social grace might no longer claim the 
evidentiary weight necessary to claim legal protection for the reputation 
in their racial identity.195  Regardless of “blood quantum,” these claimants 
 
 188. Compare id. at 947–49, with Stultz v. Cousins, 242 F. 794, 798 (6th Cir. 1917) 
(discussing internal union records regarding the plaintiff’s racial identity as publications 
for the purpose of libel). 
 189. Hargrove v. Okla. Press Publ’g Co., 265 P. 635, 635–36 (Okla. 1928). 
 190. Compare id. at 637, with Express Publ’g Co. v. Orsborn, 151 S.W. 574, 574–
75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (affirming the libel judgment for the plaintiff, who was 
identified in a news article not by her name but as a “negress”). 
 191. Atlanta Journal Co. v. Farmer, 172 S.E. 647, 648 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Veeder II, supra note 56, at 34 (implying the justification of physical violence 
in defense of personal reputation). 
 195. Compare this treatment with the court’s similar conclusions concerning black 
attorney Benjamin Franklin’s petition for libel.  See supra notes 108–15 and 
accompanying text. 
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failed to possess a reputation for whiteness the courts would recognize; 
they had, in this sense, lost their membership in the white community and 
with it the all-important right to claim property, dignity, or honor in the self. 
VII.  FAMILY PROPERTY: WHITENESS IN MARRIAGE 
Miscegenation statutes passed by state legislatures of the Jim Crow 
South between 1870 and 1890 regulated the status of the marriage 
contract by defining racial identity and prohibiting interracial unions, 
annulling marriages, and subjecting the parties to possible criminal 
prosecution.196  One of the central legal effects of annulling the marriage 
contract was to remove any burden of alimony and dower and to 
extinguish any devises of property in probate.197  As Chief Justice 
Brown of the Georgia Supreme Court opined in 1869: 
I do not hesitate to say that it was dictated by wise statesmanship, and has a broad 
and solid foundation in enlightened policy, sustained by sound reason and 
common sense.  The amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, but it is 
always productive of deplorable results. . . .  [S]uch connections never elevate the 
inferior race to the position of the superior, but they bring down the superior to 
that of the inferior.  They are productive of evil, and evil only, without any 
corresponding good.198 
 
 196. See, for example, Missouri’s antimiscegenation legislation, MO. REV. STAT. § 
4727 (1909), which determined that, within the confines of this statute, a black person 
was any person having one-eighth part or more of “negro blood.”  North Carolina 
prohibited the marriage between a white person and any “person of mixed blood to the 
third generation.”  State v. Melton, 44 N.C. (Busb.) 49, 51 (1852) (finding no infraction 
where the person evinced an admixture of Indian blood); see also Linton v. State, 7 So. 261, 
262 (Ala. 1890) (holding that, because “mulatto” is subsumed in the definition of “Negro,” the 
defendant violated Alabama’s antimiscegenation law by cohabiting with a mulatto man). 
 197. Legal challenges to the validity of a marriage often surfaced in probate court, 
where petitioners sought to constrain the devising of estates to surviving spouses and 
heirs.  See Locklayer v. Locklayer, 35 So. 1008, 1009 (Ala. 1904) (determining that the 
deceased’s spouse, who was considered a white woman, could not receive her husband’s 
personal property, as he was regarded as a black man and the marriage was void as a 
matter of law under state statute); Ferrall v. Ferrall, 69 S.E. 60, 62 (N.C. 1910) (reversing 
a decision to void a marriage as a violation of the miscegenation statute, observing that 
the husband’s efforts at avoidance were predicated on a desire to not pay alimony and 
dower); Hopkins v. Bowers, 16 S.E. 1, 1–2 (N.C. 1892) (holding that the children of a 
deceased father could not inherit land challenged by father’s sister because they issued 
from his marriage to a reputedly black woman based on evidence that she “associated 
with colored people”).  Additionally, Ray Stannard Baker recounts the 1907 case of Mrs. 
Elsie Massey of Tipton County, Tennessee, who was accused of being “a Negro, the 
daughter of a cotton planter named ‘Ed’ Barrow, and a quadroon slave.”  BAKER, supra 
note 21, at 152–53.  Only after a jury declared her “of pure Caucasian blood” might she 
and her children inherit $250,000 in property.  Id. at 153; see also Pascoe, supra note 55, 
at 220–21 (discussing civil miscegenation cases in the postbellum period as frequently 
depriving widows in interracial marriages of any testamentary rights predicated on the 
view that any interracial relationship involved criminally illicit sexual ties). 
 198. State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753, 756–57 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1890) (quoting Scott v. State, 
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The cultural concern over “amalgamation” provided the backdrop for 
judicial efforts to tend the boundaries of racial property lines to ensure 
the value of whiteness and determine the sources of racial meaning.199 
In 1911, Louis Marre, a white man of Italian ancestry born in St. 
Louis, Missouri, sought to annul his three-year marriage to Agnes Nash 
Marre.200  The trial court rendered a favorable decision for Louis based, 
in large part, on his assertion and the testimony of fellow witnesses that 
Agnes had enough “negro blood,” to render their marriage void under 
the Missouri antimiscegenation statute.201  The Marre case provides a 
glimpse into the legal importance of community impressions of racial 
identity and marriage—impressions arrived at through force of habit and 
the skin color of acquaintances of the most remote sort.202  The 
testimony of two witnesses convinced the trial court that Agnes Marre 
was black, thus leading to the dissolution of the marriage.203  One 
witness, a clerk in a store where Agnes was employed indicated that 
Agnes had worked in a department that was “in the habit of employing 
colored girls.”204  While the witness also admitted that the store had no 
rules to this effect, the mere possibility of interracial hiring and working 
conditions disposed the trial court to annul the marriage as a violation of 
the state miscegenation statute.205  The second witness, a grocer who had 
business dealings with Agnes, testified that she had once asked him to 
move a trunk from her house to the home of a black family.206  Further 
 
39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869)) (unindicated alterations in original). 
 199. By attending to the concern for amalgamation, the courts not only were trying 
to protect whiteness, but also were retaining the meaning of whiteness within the terms 
of the old property regime, for amalgamation would rearrange the constellation of 
individuals whose relations determined the meaning of any given property right.  In the 
discourse of the new property regime, amalgamation led to a redefinition of whiteness 
because the jural relations imparting meaning and value to that term or object would be 
realigned. 
 200. Marre v. Marre, 168 S.W. 636, 637, 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914).  The appellate 
court also considered and rejected the petitioner’s claim that the marriage was void on 
grounds of duress.  Louis Marre provided testimony that his wife’s brother had 
threatened to kill him if he did not marry her, averring that on the day of the wedding he 
was locked in the pregnant defendant’s bedroom by her mother until he agreed, in 
particular, to a be wed by a Roman Catholic priest.  Id. at 637–38. 
 201. Id. at 639–40; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 4727 (1909). 
 202. Marre, 168 S.W. at 639–40. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 639. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 640.  Interestingly, such conclusions were couched in terms of Agnes’s 
family’s economic condition, the court noting that the family rented a building on the 
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testimony indicated that members of Louis’s family had “seen negroes 
go to the house of defendant’s mother; had seen a sister, on one 
occasion, walking on the street with a Negro woman, and that they 
considered defendant’s family negroes.”207 
Overturning the trial court’s decision, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
found “not a particle of tangible evidence” proving that Agnes Marre 
had more than the allowable one-eighth of “negro blood” coursing 
through her veins.208  In reaching its conclusion the court rendered 
visible the law’s position that blood signified race by relying on the 
narrative of genealogy and dismissing as scurrilous gossip the witness 
testimony so convincing to the trial court.209  Filling out the family tree, 
the court noted the testimony of Agnes’s mother, who located the family 
roots in Kentucky and Mexico.210  Agnes’s mother adopted a discourse 
of the body in testifying that “there was no negro blood in the family, in 
the veins of herself, her husband or her children.”211  Judge Reynolds 
focused on the family’s genealogical attributes, noting that Agnes’s 
sisters had all married white men and that “their associates are with 
white people.”212 
Complicating the defendant’s case was the opprobrium of “shame” 
accompanying Louis’s racial assertions.  Indeed, the family was so 
anxious to avoid publicity regarding the charges that the court had to 
compel Agnes’s own sisters to come forward on her behalf with proof 
that they had indeed married white men.213  The court’s necessity to 
compel evidence of family marriage indicated not only the degree of 
infamy involved in proffering the question of racial identity but also the 
crucial ways in which that identity proved tenuous.  Mere rumor might 
undo the opportunity to participate in the privileges of whiteness.  For 
while the Marre court exhibited a rhetorical gesture toward the necessity 
of genealogical evidence to prove blood lineage in line with statutory 
constraints, it rendered its opinion based on evidence of association.214  
 
back lot of the plaintiff’s property while also discussing Agnes’s brother’s progression 
through a series of mental institutions. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.; see also Wilson v. State, 101 So. 417, 421 (Ala. Ct. App. 1924) (finding no 
need to “trace the antecedents of a defendant in order to establish the race of an 
accused,” while also permitting a witness to testify “if he knows such to be the fact, . . . 
that a person is a negro, or is a white person, or that he is a man, or that she is a 
woman . . . [because] in this jurisdiction certainly every person possessed of any degree 
of intelligence knows a negro”). 
 211. Marre, 168 S.W. at 640. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
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Indeed, while the court insisted “color is in itself no proof of blood,”215 
associational evidence might prove conclusive.  Thus, consonant with the 
metonymic characteristic of the relied-upon object of whiteness—blood 
quantum—the courts established title to racial identity not as a certain 
and visible possession, but as invisible until rendered by law.216  The 
law’s cultural work consisted of providing the discursive conduit for 
rendering the invisible blood a visible signifier of a legal right, while 
simultaneously anchoring the invisible in the legitimacy of property 
discourse. 
Some miscegenation decisions sought to use state statutes delineating 
blood ratios in fixing the meaning of race as a way of avoiding any 
reliance on the “common parlance of the people” to determine racial 
identity.217  In the 1910 case of Ferrall v. Ferrall, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court confronted the state miscegenation law adopted in 1883 
and transferred into the North Carolina State Constitution: “That all 
marriages between a white person and a . . . person of negro descent to 
the third generation inclusive are hereby forever prohibited.”218  In 
writing the opinion for the court, Justice Hoke determined that, under the 
specificity of the statute, it was not enough that the ancestor in question 
be regarded as a black person in the eyes of the community, but that “the 
ancestor of the third generation whose blood should determine the issue 
must have been of pure negro blood.”219  While this merely moved the 
inquiry of racial identity to another generation, it effectively silenced the 
plaintiff in this case, who averred that the community regarded his 
wife’s great-grandfather as possessing a “strain of negro blood” while 
failing to prove that the ancestor had no “white blood in him.”220  
Indeed, the plaintiff sought to press an interpretation of the state statute 
that relied not on blood quantum, but on the ancestor’s “status as a negro 
ascertained and fixed by the recognition and general consensus of the 
community where his lot is cast.”221  The court rejected the plaintiff’s 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. See Saks, supra note 26, at 40–47 (discussing the signifier of blood quantum in 
the context of miscegenation jurisprudence). 
 217. The notion of the “common parlance of the people,” was interchangeable with the 
Plessy Court’s search for the “general sentiment of the community.”  Compare Ferrall v. 
Ferrall, 69 S.E. 60, 61 (N.C. 1910), with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 218. Ferrall, 69 S.E. at 62 (discussing article 14, section 8 of the state constitution). 
 219. Id. at 61. 
 220. Id. at 60–61. 
 221. Id. at 61–62. 
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efforts to “[set] up a varying and uncertain standard” while avoiding any 
mention of the parallel standard discussed in Plessy.222 
The Ferrall decision provides a view of the efforts to enunciate “blood 
purity” separate from the “general consensus of the community” as a 
judicial standard in determining the propriety of racial identity.223  By 
requiring blood purity in the ancestor of the third generation to ascertain 
the claimant’s racial identity, the Ferrall court insisted on a proprietary 
reading of race as possession of title.224  Yet this reading simultaneously 
enlarged the scope of those persons able to claim whiteness, rendering 
the definition even more ambiguous.  The court reversed the usual order 
of proof in race misrecognition cases by framing the determination of 
whiteness under the state’s miscegenation statute in terms of a “strain” 
of blood.  Thus, unless a plaintiff could demonstrate that a defendant’s 
ancestor, three generations prior, contained no trace of “white blood,” a 
petitioner could not prove that the defendant was not necessarily 
white.225  The court’s requirement of blood purity to register the absence 
of whiteness contrasted with decisions in other states by reversing the 
type of blood quantum required.  Where courts in other states found that 
whiteness could not obtain in petitioners with one drop of “black” blood, the 
Ferrall court concluded that any strain of “white” blood in the petitioner’s 
ancestor, three generations removed, created the possibility of whiteness. 
In legal discourse, blood lineage served as title to the property of 
racial identity.  Yet, in a metonymic double gesture, blood itself required 
representation.  As such, blood quantum as the object of whiteness that 
enabled the legal expression of title to property in racial identity required 
associational evidence to register legal credibility.  Consequently, the 
proof required to demonstrate a legally cognizable violation of state 
miscegenation laws replicated the tensions, evident in Plessy, between 
an object putatively inhering in the body and the relational posture of an 
individual’s subjectivity.  As courts sought to fix racial identity through 
the insistent rhetoric of a titular conception of property, reliance on that 
rhetoric proved difficult in both theory and practice.  The evidentiary 
demands for demonstrating racial identity—self-professed statements, 
genealogy, witness testimony, community associations—all resonated 
within an associational discourse to signal possession. 
 
 222. Id. at 62; see Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549. 
 223. Ferrall, 69 S.E. at 61–62. 
 224. Id. at 63. 
 225. See id. 
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VIII.  THE WHITENESS OF CHILDREN: MANDAMUS                                         
AND SCHOOL SEGREGATION 
While states in the American South sought to regulate marriage through 
a statutory delineation of racial identity comprised of percentages, they 
required an absolute prohibition of racial intermixing in schools.226  For 
instance, North Carolina’s miscegenation statute prohibited the marriage of 
blacks to whites only if the amount of “Negro blood” was greater than one-
eighth, or within the third generation, but the state regulation of public 
schools sought a sweeping separation of the races.227  The legislature provided 
that all white children shall be taught in the public schools provided for the 
white race and all colored shall be taught in schools provided for the colored 
race, but no child with negro blood in its veins, however remote the strain, shall 
attend a school for the white race.228 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed the incompatibility 
between the state’s provisions on school segregation229 and miscegenation230 
in Johnson v. Board of Education.231  Writing for the court, Judge Walker 
determined that, while the state’s miscegenation provision validated the  
marriage between plaintiff and the mother of his children, it does only that 
much, and legitimates the offspring of the union, but by no subtle alchemy 
known to the laboratory of logic can it be claimed to have extracted the negro 
element from the blood in the veins of such offspring and made it pure.232   
 
 226. In the name of protecting the racial integrity of the children, one court 
endorsed removing a woman’s children from a former marriage when she later wed a 
man with “negro blood in his veins.”  Moon v. Children’s Home Soc’y, 72 S.E. 707, 708 
(Va. 1911).  In Moon, the Virginia Circuit Court of Albemarle County gave custody of 
Lucy Moon’s children to the Children’s Home Society of Virginia because 
their mother had married a person with colored blood, who was only recognized as 
a colored man, and that the associations of these children, who were of pure blood 
and gentle ancestors would be with persons of mixed blood, and that they would be 
deterred from association with gentle people of white blood. 
Id. 
 227. Ferrall, 69 S.E. at 61. 
 228. Id. at 62 (quoting N.C. PUB. L. ch. 435, § 22 (1903)); see Hare v. Bd. of Educ., 
18 S.E. 55, 55–56 (N.C. 1893) (upholding a jury verdict denying admission to a white-
only school to the plaintiff’s children, who could not prove that they themselves were 
four generations removed from a “full-blooded Negro”). 
 229. See N.C. CONST. of 1876, art. IX, § 2 (“[T]he children of the white race and the 
children of the colored race shall be taught in separate public schools; but there shall be 
no discrimination in favor of or to the prejudice of either race.”). 
 230. Id. at art. XIV, § 8. 
 231. 82 S.E. 832 (N.C. 1914). 
 232. Id. at 833. 
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Judge Walker’s attention to blood purity underscores the prevalent fears 
of race amalgamation in the American South and further confirms 
Gilbert Stephenson’s 1908 observation that “[m]iscegenation has never 
been allowed to be a bridge upon which one might cross from the Negro 
race to the Caucasian, though it has been allowed as a thoroughfare from 
the Caucasian to the Negro.”233  Yet, Judge Walker’s extended concern 
with the social arena of blood purity reflected more than an 
acquiescence to legislative line drawing, it indicated the anxieties over 
education and children in the possible contamination and dissolution of 
title to whiteness.234 
Confronted by school board decisions to expel their children from 
white-only schools due to concerns over racial identity, parents utilized a 
writ of mandamus to proffer a reputational claim for their children’s 
whiteness and quash the actions of school trustees.  Regarded as 
extraordinary, a writ of mandamus was a legal form by which a court 
might compel an administrative body, in this case a school board and its 
officers, to perform a mandatory duty to ensure the petitioner’s exercise 
of a clear legal right.  Petitioners sought these writs from the courts both 
as a way of compelling the white-only schools to allow their children’s 
attendance and to validate the family’s whiteness.  Most courts viewed 
the application for mandamus as an opportunity to review the evidence 
concerning a child’s racial identity, compelling reinstatement where the 
school board’s decision failed to pass legal muster. 
As parents confronted school board removal decisions by arguing that 
their children were white, southern state courts sought to define race in 
the vernacular.  Thus, in the parlance of the court, the word “white” 
meant any “member of the white or Caucasian race, and the word 
‘colored’ mean[t], not only negroes, but persons who [were] of the 
mixed blood.”235  After addressing the meaning of the term “colored 
children” with a brief reference to Webster’s dictionary, one Kentucky 
court determined that “[a] person who has any perceptible admixture of 
African blood is generally called a colored person.  In affixing the 
epithet ‘colored,’ we do not ordinarily stop to estimate the precise 
shade.”236  Adopting the vernacular or “common understanding” of the 
terms, particularly the notion that the term “colored” embraced “any 
 
 233. Stephenson, supra note 97, at 43. 
 234. See Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 183 S.W. 269, 276 (Ky. 
1916) (discussing the ease of distinguishing between black and white persons on the 
basis of education); BAKER, supra note 21, at 152 (discussing the “fair education and 
polished manners” of a man the community thought to be passing for white). 
 235. Moreau v. Grandich, 75 So. 434, 435 (Miss. 1917). 
 236. Mullins v. Belcher, 134 S.W. 1151, 1151 (Ky. 1911) (quoting Enos Van Camp 
v. Bd. of Educ., 9 Ohio St. 406, 407, 412 (1859)). 
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appreciable mixture of negro blood,” enabled courts to avoid the 
meaning of race deployed in state marriage statutes and constitutional 
amendments.237 
The judicial interest in guaranteeing the unassailability of whiteness 
goes some distance toward explaining the legislative inconsistencies 
between miscegenation statutes and school segregation.  For instance, 
the Mississippi Supreme Court’s observation in 1917 dismissing the 
state miscegenation statute as “not necessarily mak[ing] children having 
less than one-eighth negro blood members of the white race” placed the 
value of whiteness in the public and social services provided for the 
white community—especially education.238  The court’s enforcement of 
the narrow one-drop rule reflected an anxiety that education might serve as a 
conduit through which families might alienate the property of whiteness 
and arrogate to themselves a seemingly uncertain racial identity.239 
Indeed, as one court acknowledged in reaching a decision in a school 
mandamus case, admission to the “privileges” of whiteness “will very 
much depend on character and conduct; and it may be well and proper 
that a man of worth, honesty, industry, and respectability, should have 
the rank of a white man, while a vagabond of the same degree of blood 
should be confined to the inferior caste.”240  The requirement of absolute 
blood purity in mandamus cases thus “confined to the inferior caste” 
those children whose racial identity the community questioned.241  
Withholding equivalent educational opportunity lessened the possibility 
that these children might eventually garner the “character and conduct” 
necessary to be acknowledged as white.242  In this sense, the condition of 
absolute blood purity in regulating school segregation amounted to a 
tacit acknowledgment that, regardless of blood quantum, an individual 
 
 237. See id. (noting that Webster’s definition of “colored people” is consonant with 
“the common understanding” of the term); Lee v. New Orleans Great N. R.R. Co., 51 So. 
182, 183 (La. 1910) (discussing the shifting meaning of the term “colored” as initially 
applied to any resident of the state not considered black or white, but which, in the 
postbellum period, was applied by the courts to mean only black persons); see also GA. 
CODE ANN. § 1708 (1873) (stating simply that “[t]he marriage relation between white 
persons and persons of African descent is forever prohibited, and such marriages shall be 
null and void”).  As the court observed in State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753, 756 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 
1890), the legislature adopted this policy “with the purpose to preserve, as far as the laws 
may accomplish that result, the purity and distinctness of the races inhabiting the state.” 
 238. Moreau, 75 So. at 435. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Tucker v. Blease, 81 S.E. 668, 673 (S.C. 1914). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id.; see BAKER, supra note 21, at 151. 
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might acquire whiteness through comportment, that whiteness existed 
not as a thing but as an action, not as an object but as a behavior, not 
inherent in the self but generated through the community. 
Sylvia Gilliand knew well the racial meaning of even the most 
perfunctory action in the community when, in 1905, she brought a 
mandamus action against the board of education of Buncombe County 
and the school committee of Avery’s Creek Township of North Carolina 
to force the school to reinstate her children in the county’s white public 
schools.243  In removing the Gilliand children from the school, the board 
testified to their belief that the great-grandfather, Jeffrey Graham, a man 
of “Portuguese descent,” possessed a “mixture of negro blood.”244  At 
trial, the Gilliands provided pivotal testimony from William Whitesides, 
a neighbor of Jeffrey Graham in the early 1860s, to the effect that 
Graham had voted, or that at least “[t]here was nothing said against his 
voting.”245  On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court found little 
merit in the school board’s objection to this testimony, weighing it as 
evidence of Graham’s “pure white blood.”246  The court found “the fact 
that the ancestor was permitted to vote openly and without any objection is 
most pertinent” in determining racial heritage.247  The court emphasized 
that evidence of racial identity need not encompass merely the oral 
expression of a community, as “questions of race ancestry, general or 
common reputation” should also be afforded legal weight.248  By 
“general or common reputation” the court meant to embrace the 
unspoken understanding of a locale, “the manner in which a man is 
received and treated by his neighbors and the community generally.”249 
Of course, determining the boundaries of a “general or common 
reputation” often proved illusive and volatile.  One claimant, J.R. Medlin, 
discovered this when he sought a writ of mandamus against the Wake 
County school board of North Carolina for removing his children from 
 
 243. Gilliand v. Bd. of Educ., 54 S.E. 413, 414 (N.C. 1906). 
 244. Id. at 414, 415. 
 245. Id. at 414. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id.  Other jurisdictions regarded opinion evidence of race as admissible.  As 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma observed at length in 1912: 
It is manifest that one who has known a friend for many years should be 
permitted to say that he is a white man or a negro man without stopping to say 
that his hair is straight or curly; that his face is white or black; that his eyes are 
blue or black; that he knew his father and mother, and that their characteristics 
were those of the white or black race; that he knew his brothers and sisters; and 
that their characteristics are those of the black or white race.  While to a certain 
extent it is the expression of an opinion, it is also the statement of a fact. 
Cole v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. Number 29, 123 P. 426, 427 (Okla. 1912). 
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the white-only school.250  Through the jury trial and appellate proceedings, 
the school board insisted that, because the community generally 
regarded the children’s maternal grandmother, Nan Powers, to be “of 
mixed blood,” they could not attend the white-only school.251  
Reviewing the trial record, however, the state supreme court noted the 
conflicting community narratives regarding the Medlin’s racial 
identity.252  One witness, Elma Maynard, testified to the general 
reputation that Nan Powers was of “mixed blood.”253  Yet this same 
witness remarked, “It is generally reputed that two or three men started 
the rumor that Medlin’s children were mixed blooded.”254  Relying on 
this evidence, a divided court found the Medlin children had “purely 
white blood” because “there was a widely spread report which was not 
believed because it was of general repute that it was a trumped-up 
charge.”255  However, whether one narrative trumped another did little to 
diminish the evidentiary weight of the community’s “common” voice, as 
the judicial inquiry remained wedded to the legal discourse of  “general 
reputation” in determining whiteness. 
Southern states constitutionalized school segregation by race, weaving 
it into, as one state supreme court insisted, the “organic law” of the 
people.256  The Oklahoma State Constitution declared the existence of 
only two races in the state, “persons of African descent” and whites, 
assigning all nonblack persons to the white race.257  South Carolina’s 
constitution declared, “Separate schools shall be provided for children of 
the white and colored races, and no child of either race shall ever be 
permitted to attend a school provided for children of the other race.”258  
 
 250. Medlin v. County Bd. of Educ., 83 S.E. 483, 483–84 (N.C. 1914). 
 251. Id. at 484. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 484 (emphasis added). 
 256. Ferrall v. Ferrall, 69 S.E. 60, 62 (N.C. 1910); see Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 82 
S.E. 832, 833 (N.C. 1914) (applying the separate schools provision of the North Carolina 
Constitution).  Article IX, section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution of 1905 reads in 
pertinent part: “[T]he children of the white race and the children of the colored race shall 
be taught in separate public schools . . . .”  N.C. CONST. of  1876, art. IX, § 2. 
 257. OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. XXIII, § 11; see also Cole v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. 
Number 29, 123 P. 426, 426–27 (Okla. 1912) (affirming the constitutional declaration 
that the state had only two races, black and nonblack, in the state and finding error in the 
trial court’s exclusion of testimony that the plaintiff’s children attended white-only 
schools in Kentucky). 
 258. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 33. 
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Southern state constitutions even provided de jure, if not de facto, equal 
financing.259  The Kentucky State Constitution, for instance, determined 
that “[i]n distributing the school fund no distinction shall be made on 
account of race or color, and separate schools for white and colored 
children shall be maintained.”260 
Yet, while the state constitutions determined the legal ground for 
separate facilities based on race, the courts and school boards engaged as 
tribunals for delimiting and declaring whiteness when questions of racial 
identity arose concerning attendance.  State courts afforded local school 
board trustees wide latitude in dismissing students from white-only 
schools on the basis of racial “impurity.”261  Moreover, state school 
segregation statutes allowed the exclusion of children without formal 
investigations or proceeding, with one court noting, “It is immaterial 
how the board obtained its information if they possessed knowledge or 
information which warranted their action as reasonable men.”262  In 
removing students discerned as not “clear-blooded” in the eyes of the 
community, trustees exercised their legislatively granted authority to act 
in the “best interest of the school.”263 
Under the auspices of this legislative authority, the trustees of the 
Dalcho public schools in South Carolina removed the children of John 
Kirby because they had “always heard that he was not clear-blooded.”264  
The trial court heard sworn testimony from thirteen members of the 
community averring that, as far as they knew, John Kirby was not white.  
 
 259. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (noting that through taxation the state will provide a 
uniform system of public schools, separated by race); Johnson, 82 S.E. at 833 (reversing 
a grant of writ of mandamus to the plaintiffs, whose children sought entrance to white 
public schools, noting the state constitution’s direction that “[t]he children of the white 
race and the children of the colored race shall be taught in separate public schools; but 
there shall be no discrimination in favor or to the prejudice of either race”). 
 260. KY. CONST. of 1890, § 187. 
 261. Eubank v. Boughton, 36 S.E. 529, 530 (Va. 1900). 
 262. State ex rel. Black v. Bd. of Dirs. of Sch. Dist. Number 16, 242 S.W. 545, 546 
(Ark. 1922); see also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8915, 8916 (Michie 1921) (providing for the 
segregation of black and white children in separate schools and remaining silent on the 
issue of whether the directors of a school are required to have a formal investigation or 
proceeding in determining racial identity for the purposes of exclusion). 
 263. See S.C. CIV. CODE § 1761 (1912) (stating that trustees had the power “[t]o 
suspend or dismiss pupils when the best interest of the schools make it necessary”); see 
also Tucker v. Blease, 81 S.E. 668, 670, 675 (S.C. 1914) (following the maxim “[t]he 
greatest good to the largest number” in concluding that, due to the community parents’ 
opposition to allowing their children’s attendance at school alongside the plaintiff’s 
children, “it would seem to be far better that the children in question should be 
segregated than that the large majority of the children attending that school should be 
denied educational advantages”); Johnson, 82 S.E. at 833 (excluding the plaintiff’s 
children from the white-only school because, while the father possessed a “pure strain of 
blood,” the mother did not). 
 264. Tucker, 81 S.E. at 669. 
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These witnesses further insisted that returning his children to the school 
would result in “a wholesale resigning of the trustees and a tearing up of 
the school.”265  One witness, the son of the author of a history of Marion 
County, produced a family tree into evidence and observed, “the per 
cent. of the colored blood in the Kirby children is one thirty-second.”266  
In reviewing this testimony, the South Carolina Supreme Court declared 
that under blood mixture criteria both the state statute and constitution 
considered the Kirby children white.267  Indeed, prior to this suit, the 
community had also regarded John Kirby as white, for in his lifetime 
Kirby attended white schools, belonged to the white First Baptist Church 
at Dillon, voted and conducted business with white men, and married a 
white woman.268  At his death, Kirby was buried in the white cemetery 
of the First Baptist Church.269 
Yet, in yearning to ensure the unquestioned racial purity of the school 
and guard against diminishing the future value of whiteness, the animus 
of community sentiment reframed and conditioned the indices of blood 
and association relied upon by the court.  By arguing for the removal of 
the Kirby children “in the best interest of the school,” the trustees 
arrogated to themselves the authority to determine racial identity through 
a differentiating lens of community sentiment that established, rather 
than relied upon, the meaning of family lineage and local associations.270  
Under this litmus test, past character and conduct determined racial 
identity less than did the immediacy of local community sentiment.  
Thus, a community that treated John Kirby as a white man both in life 
and in death might also, under the press of public opinion, relegate his 
children to a “school for mulattos” in the name of racial purity.271  Under 
this standard, the courts’ legal efforts to regulate the value of whiteness 
through the putatively objective determinates of blood or heritage 
paradoxically redounded to the most local and uncertain of social 
bodies—the whim of community sentiment.272 
 
 265. Id. at 670. 
 266. Id. at 671. 
 267. Id.; see S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. III, § 33 (“The marriage of a white person 
with a negro or mulatto, or person who shall have one-eighth or more negro blood, shall 
be unlawful and void.”); see also S.C. CIV. CODE § 1780 (1912). 
 268. Tucker, 81 S.E. at 670. 
 269. Id. at 671–72. 
 270. Id. 
 271. This particular community provided three different schools for children; these 
were designated as black, white, and mulatto.  Id. at 672. 
 272. As one state supreme court justice observed regarding race determination in a 
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The case of the Kirby children indicated one of the cultural 
mechanisms deployed for alienating the property of whiteness.  In 
admitting that the law of South Carolina entitled the children to be 
“classed as white,” the court nevertheless found the board of trustees’ 
refusal to reinstate them in the white school as “neither capricious nor 
arbitrary.”273  Deploying the law to require the children’s readmission 
would, the court insisted, “conflict with the general sentiment of the 
community” and embroil the judiciary in an arena presumably beyond 
its competence—regulating the social conditions of race.274  
Nevertheless, by refusing to apply South Carolina’s legal definition of 
race, the court revealed the inseparability of the legal meaning of race 
from its social condition, the very situation the court hoped to avoid by 
relying on the objectivity of blood quantum.275 
Moreover, the court’s position revealed the concern over the issue of 
alienability in the new regime of property constructed as a constellation 
of social relationships with regard to some object.  While the court 
focused on whether the blood quantum of the Kirby children enabled 
them to be classified as white, the application of the meaning of this 
object rested in the hands of the community that, by denying the children 
a place in the white school, alienated the family’s property in 
whiteness.276  The court’s determination of whiteness gained meaning, 
weight, and value through a constellation of social relationships; the 
nexus of this constellation rested in a local community marked by a 
culture of racial hierarchy.  Such local authority could serve only to 
exacerbate the anxiety over the tenuousness of racial identity, an anxiety 
born from the realization that whiteness exhibited the qualities of 
 
school mandamus case, “Reputation and tradition are the methods of proof by which 
pedigree and kindred matters are established.” Medlin v. County Bd. of Educ., 83 S.E. 
483, 486 (N.C. 1914). 
 273. Tucker, 81 S.E. at 675. 
 274. Id. at 674 (quoting People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 (1883)).  
The judicial stance that social questions were best left to the legislature (or some other 
political body) was not uncommon during this period fueled, as it was, by a cultural and 
political ideology that regarded the role of the court as the preeminent body for 
explaining the law rather than as a tribunal for determining social conditions.  The nature 
of this compartmentalization disregarded the production of legal meaning, in which the 
judiciary actively engaged in legal interpretations that shaped the cultural construction of 
identity and property, the very concepts underpinning the legal evaluation of race.  Yet, 
the legal culture that fostered such line-drawing rested on an ideology of objectivity that 
deployed the image of a judiciary insulated from the vicissitudes of politics and 
pressures of social inequality.  The culture of legal objectivity fostered a discourse of 
professional separation as essential for justice, fairness, and the rule of law and as 
comporting with the tenets of a limited judiciary in a democracy in which the laws were 
enacted by an elected body, but interpreted by an appointed tribunal. 
 275. Id. at 675. 
 276. See supra note 12 (discussing the alienability of the social self). 
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property that might be alienated by the community itself.277  Courts 
fueled this tension by relying on a discourse of community sentiment 
that removed whiteness as an intrinsic marker of identity.  In this way,  
the new regime of property fostered anxiety over individual character 
and the meaning of identity, but it also opened a space for self-
identification and racial redefinition.  If court and community could 
deny whiteness, if it were alienable in law, it might also be assumed.  
This understandably accentuated the volatility of racial personality, 
while also locating the certainty of racial identity outside of the self. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Opinions by southern jurists, entertaining reputational claims for racial 
identity, whether through defamation, miscegenation, or mandamus, 
indicated the evanescent characteristics of whiteness as court and 
claimant prospected the cultural landscape in pursuit of racial certainty.  
These opinions also suggested the racial composition of property in the 
self, as the personality interests comprising reputation in whiteness 
gathered substance and legal weight from the cultivated sentiments of a 
judicially constructed white community, while those reputations 
considered beyond the “kin” of whiteness languished at the law.  
Consequently, only white reputation appeared as a property interest in 
which honor and dignity provided the currency for a legally cognizable 
harm.  In the grammatical universe of the law, property in the self 
inferred reputation, while the legal validation of that social self 
presumed whiteness. 
Southern jurists’ fidelity toward legal certainty and their own yearning 
to constrain the meaning and circulation of whiteness yielded a discourse 
of biological fact in which the coherent objectivity of blood 
accompanied the legal rhetoric of entitlement, possession, and 
ownership.  Yet, just as the “old atom of property” had burst in the arena 
of corporate capital, dividing ownership from control, judicial focus on 
the ownership of racial identity refracted through the cultural lens of 
reputational claims; racial subjectivity redounded to the control of the 
social self.  As courts sought to maintain the property value of whiteness 
in the body politic through a discourse of intrinsic character, the 
community determined the meaning of whiteness through extrinsic 
evaluations of personality.  As a reputational and discursive relationship, 
 
 277. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 152. 
DOUGLAS.DOC 1/9/2020  11:20 AM 
 
946 
racial identity located meaning and direction in a constellation of cultural 
moments, including social and economic comportment, association, family 
narrative, and community opinions regarding appearance. 
Mediating the tensions between an established, object-centered view 
of property and an emerging vision of property as convened by, and 
through, social relations proved illusive for southern jurists wedded to 
the conception of an innate racial identity.  Standing alone, the signifying 
power of blood quantum failed to express the material embodiment of 
white selfhood.  Yet, by seeking to establish the certainty of an innate 
white identity in the presumed objectivity of blood quantum, these jurists 
provided the conduit through which the entitlement of whiteness emerged 
as the impertinent possession of an imagined community.  Thus, rather 
than localizing the idea of whiteness as embodied in the individual, the 
legal narrative of blood quantum burst judicial efforts at containment by 
registering the proof of white identity through the logical entailment of a 
relational conception of property, or in the language of Plessy, the 
“general sentiment of the community.”  The ensuing volatility and 
fragmentation of racial identity created the very possibility of, and 
means for, misrecognition and passing. 
 
